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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ELIZABETH ANN BARSON, a minor 
by and through her guardians 
ad litem, Dennie J. Barson 
and Kathleen W. Barson, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
E. R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC., 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 18254 
-----------------------------------------
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal arises out of a products liability action brought 
by the parents as guardians ad litem on behalf of Elizabeth Ann 
Barson, a minor, to recover damages for birth defects, principally 
the absence of both arms, allegedly caused by the pre-natal 
administration to the plaintiff's mother of the drug Delalutin, 
manufactured by the defendant E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. ("Squibb"). 1 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BELOW 
The case was tried to a jury which rendered a verdict against 
Squibb for $1.5 million, upon which judgment was entered. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Squibb seeks a new trial based on the erroneous and prejudicial 
admission of certain evidence at the trial, the erroneous legal 
instructions given to the jury by the trial court over the objection 
of Squibb, and the trial court's failure to grant Squibb's motions 
to dismiss and for a new trial. 
1 
The amended complaint in this case charged E. R. Squibb & 
Sons, Inc., the operating company, and Squibb Corporation, its 
parent, as defendants. Squibb Corporation obtained a directed 
verdict during the course of the trial and, hence, is not involved 
in the appeal (Tr.1497). The amended complaint also named Dr. 
Parkinson, the treating physician, as a defendant. Dr. Parkinson 
obtained summary judgment prior to the commencement of trial 
(PR.113-117). 
-1-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. The Drug Delalutin and Its Regulatory History Through 
the Time of Use By Plaintiff's Mother. 
Delalutin, whose chemical name is 17-alpha-hydroxyprogesterone 
caproate, is an injectable drug product developed prior to 1955 
by Schering A.G., an international pharmaceutical company located 
in Berlin, Germany (Tr.1902, 2178). 2 Delalutin is chemically 
identical to progestational hormones naturally present in the 
female with the exception that a caproate ester is added to 
hydroxyprogesterone to make it biologically more active and 
longer-lasting (Tr.1800; P.Ex.lO(a)). 
Progestational agents, including progesterone and hydroxy-
progesterone, are essential in the maintenance of a pregnancy 
(Tr.390, 832, 1517-18, 1519-1520, 1555, 1913; D.Ex.820). One of 
their main effects is to insure relaxation of the uterus during 
pregnancy (Tr.1520; 1817-1819; 1913). The uterus, which in its 
2 
References to the record in this case will be made in the 
following manner. 
(1) One volume of separately numbered papers and pleadings 
filed in the trial court and designated for inclusion in the 
record on appeal will be prefaced by the letter "R." 
(2) A separate one-volume transcript of the proceedings at 
pretrial will be prefaced by the letters "PR.tr 
(3) Sixteen volumes of transcript of trial and post-trial 
proceedings, will be referred to by the abbreviation "Tr. 11 • 
(4) All exhibits received at trial will be referred to by 
the Letters "P. Ex." for plaintiff's Exhibits and "D. Ex." for 
Squibb's Exhibits. 
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normal non-pregnant condition is a firm muscular organ ~out the 
size of a pear, must expand significantly by the end of gestation 
to accommodate a full-term baby (Tr.1520). Uterine contractions 
during early pregnancy due to a deficiency of hydroxyprogesterone 
may tear the placenta from the uterine wall causing bleeding or 
spotting (vaginal bleeding) ; if sufficient tearing occurs a 
miscarriage or spontaneous an abortion may follow (Tr.1823). If 
the condition is treated promptly and the uterus relaxed the 
child might be saved (Tr.1824). It is recognized, however, that 
in many instances of threatened abortion the fetus is genetically 
abnormal and an abortion occurs in any event (Tr .1824; 1885). 
In January 1956 Squibb filed a New Drug Application ("NDA") 
with the United States Food and Drug Administration ( 11 FDA"), 
providing information establishing the safety of Delalutin. 3 The 
package inserts submitted in connection with the NDA noted that 
the drug was safe for a variety of medical indications, 4 including 
the management of amenorrhea, the prevention of habitual and 
3 
In 1955, Schering licensed Squibb to market this drug in the 
United States (Tr.527-528; P.Ex.231). In connection with this 
licensing Schering made its extensive animal test data regarding 
Delalutin available to Squibb (Tr.1692). Squibb also performed 
various animal tests on the drug in order to develop safety data 
for submission to Federal regulatory authorities (Tr.1236-1237, 
1683, 1691, 1713, 2001-2002). All applicable tests required by 
the FDA were performed and these tests revealed no toxicity in 
animals (Tr.1238-1239, 1671-1674, 1691, 1713-1715). 
4 
The physician package insert is a compilation of information 
relating to the use of a prescription drug directed to the physician 
(Cont'd) 
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threatened abortion, and other uses (P.Ex.lO(a)}. Squibb's NDA 
for Delalutin was approved March 13, 1956, and the company began 
marketing the drug product (Tr.1502; D.Ex.803). 
The physician package insert was changed from time to time 
over the next 15 years. As with the original insert, all changes 
to it were subject to FDA direction and control (Tr.411, 1630, 
2037, 2048, 2075). 
During this period, a number of other synthetic progestational 
agents were marketed by various pharmaceutical houses both in the 
United States and elsewhere. Although similar in some regards, 
these compounds also had marked differences from both naturally 
formed progesterone and hydroxyprogesterone (Delalutin), as well 
as from one another (Tr.1061, 1555, 1694-1695, 1768, 1917-1931). 
For example, many of them were combined with estrogen for use as 
birth control pills and pregnancy tests; Delalutin was not used 
for either purpose (P.Ex. 10(0); D.Ex.819, 821; Tr.718, 721, 823, 
869, 875, 890, 892, 1863, 1929-1930, 2010, 2038). 
The knowledge that drugs could cross the placenta and adversely 
affect a developing fetus was first gained as a result of the 
4 (Cont'd) 
and other health care providers, and is included with the drug 
packaging. The insert includes information relative to chemical 
composition, indications for use, adverse reactions and routes of 
administration. While the FDA seeks, receives and analyzes 
information from the pharmaceutical company and physicians as to 
their experiences with a drug, the agency retains final approval 
over the entire content of the insert. 
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experience in the early 1960's with Thalidomide (Tr.740-741), a 
tranquilizer manufactured and marketed throughout much of Europe, 
South America, Australia, Japan and Canada (Tr.990), though never 
approved for marketing in the United States (Tr.990). The drug 
caused severe malformations in a large number of offspring of 
mothers who took it during pregnancy. Conceptually, this experience 
represented a watershed in medical/scientific thinking (Tr.739-741). 
Prior to the mid-1960's, formal teratological studies were 
not done by pharmaceutical companies anywhere in the world. 5 
These tests were not part of the "state of the art" (Tr .1233). 
In light of the Thalidomide experience, the FDA, in cooperation 
with Squibb and several other pharmaceutical companies, developed 
guidelines for teratology tests on animals (Tr.559, 2015; P.Ex 62). 
Beginning in 1966, such testing was required on all drugs then in 
the process of development. These tests, however, were not 
required for drugs already on the market, such as Del al utin 
(P.Ex.62; Tr.581, 1227-28, 1953). 
Squibb representatives met with the FDA shortly after publica-
tion of the guidelines to discuss whether teratological testing 
nonetheless should be done on drugs already on the market (Tr.1677, 
1695-1696). It was jointly agreed that since Delalutin had then 
been on the market for 10 years, and had been used extensively in 
5 
Teratology is the branch of science that deals with the 
production, development, anatomy and classification of malformed 
fetuses. 
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hundreds of thousands of pregnant women without any reports of 
teratological effects, further animal testing under these new 
guidelines was unnecessary {Tr.1677-1680, 1695-1696, 1714-1715, 
1953, 2043-2044). 
In 1962 Congress amended the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic 
Act and introduced an efficacy requirement for drugs (21 U.S.C. 
§ 321 (p) ( 1)). Congress also determined that NDA' s, which had 
been approved between 1938 and 1962 on the existing standard of 
safety data alone, should be reviewed for the efficacy of each 
medical use or indication set out in the previously approved 
NDA's. The standard of proof for efficacy was "substantial 
evidence. 116 
6 
. "Substantial evidence" is a statutory term of art. It is 
defined in 21 u.s.c. § 355(d) as: 
evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled 
investigations, including clinical investigations ... on 
the basis of which it could fairly and responsibly be 
concluded by such experts that the drug will have the 
effect it purports or is represented to have .... 
The failure to find "substantial evidence" does not mean that the 
drug is not efficacious. Frequently such a finding means nothing 
more than that no double-blind studies, thought by some to be 
synonomous with "adequate and well-controlled investigations, 11 
were performed. A double-blind study describes a methodology 
where neither the physician nor the patient knows whether they 
are prescribing or receiving the active drug ingredient or a 
placebo (non-active ingredient). 
Giving some patients placebos and withholding a drug that is 
believed useful raises certain ethical problems (Tr.822). Because 
of these ethical problems, the Fertility and Maternal Health Drugs 
(Cont'd) 
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The FDA contracted with the National Academy of Sciences-
National Research Council ( "NAS-NRC") to undertake this retro-
spective review. 7 The NAS-NRC review procedure itself was con-
ducted by panels of physicians and other experts familiar with 
particular categories or families of drugs. This review resulted 
in advisory reports to the FDA. 8 That agency reviewed the reports 
and published its findings as Drug Efficacy Study Implementation 
(DESI) Notices in the Federal Register. Note, "Drug Efficacy and 
the 1962 Drug Amendments," 60 Geo. L.J. 185, 207-212 (1971). 
The NAS-NRC established categories which served as a basis 
for evaluating the effectiveness of each indication claimed for a 
drug. The more important categories were: (1) Effective; (2) Prob-
ably effective; (3) Possibly effective; and (4) Ineffec-
6 {Cont'd) 
Advisory Committee to the FDA ("FDA Fertility Commi ttee 11 ), in 
making its recommendations as to the efficacy of Delalutin for 
the treatment of habitual abortion, relied on studies that used 
historical controls--the use by the clinical investigator of the 
patient's own reproductive history as a measure of therapeutic 
efficacy (R~; Tr.2610, 2625). 
7 
See National Academy of Sciences, "Drug Efficacy Study, 
Final Report to the Conunissioner of Food & Drugs," Food~ Drug 
Administration 1 (1969) ("Drug Efficacy Study"). 
8 
Guidelines which were established by the NAS~NRc delineating 
the functions of the expert panels suggested that drug evaluations 
be based upon: 11 ( 1) factual information . . . freely available in 
the scientific literature, (2) factual information ... available 
from the FDA, from the manufacturer or other sources, or (3) ... 
experience and informed judgment of the members of the panels." 
Drug Efficacy Study, App. A., 3, at 43. 
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tive. 9 In 1966, Squibb made an initial submission of information 
to the NAS-NRC panel comprised of medical studies reporting the 
efficacy of Delalutin for its clinical indications, references to 
Delalutin in the world literature, and information from its NDA. 
On September 9, 1971, the FDA reported its evaluation of the 
recommendations received from the NAS-NRC as to Delalutin. 36 
Fed. Reg. 18115 (September 9, 1971). The FDA found Delalutin to 
be "effective" for a variety of indications (P.Ex.lO(n); P.Ex.lO(o)). 
Delalutin was found to be "probably effective" in preventing 
habitual and threatened abortions. 36 Fed. Reg. 18115 (September 9, 
10 1971); P.Ex. lO(n); P.Ex. lO(o). The notice specifically 
authorized continued marketing of Delalutin for prevention of 
habitual and threatened abortions. Id. at 18115; 35 Fed. Reg. 
11274 (July 14, 1970); P.Ex.lO(n); P.Ex.lO(o). 
9 
In evaluating these pre-1962 drugs, NAS-NRC panels often 
found that the new statutory standard of "substantial evidence" 
needed to support a finding of efficacy was exceedingly exacting. 
The panels ' approach in the case of drugs recognized by the 
consensus of physicians as effective, but for which supporting 
data derived from statutorily adequate investigations was 
lacking, was the liberal use of the designations "probably effec-
tive" and "possibly effective." Drug Efficacy Study at 9; Note, 
11 Drug Efficacy and the 1962 Drug Amendments," 60 Geo. L.J. 185, 
210 n. 156 (1971). -
10 
As related at Point IV A at 75 n. 51 of this Brief infra, 
the issue which may be relevant under Restatement of Torts (2d), 
§ 402A, Comment k, is not efficacy in fact but "apparent" efficacy. 
Consequently, from a legal standpoint, only FDA declarations on 
efficacy made at or about the date of use are relevant, assuming 
that the statements are otherwise admissible. 
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Squibb promptly amended its physician package insert to 
comply with the FDA directive (P.Ex.lO(n)). The November 1971 
revision of the physician package insert was in effect at the 
time Kathleen Barson received Delalutin (P.Ex.lO(o)). Up to that 
time there had been no reports in the medical literature associ-
ating limb reduction defects with progestational therapy in 
general or Delalutin in particular (Tr.1062; P.Ex.762). Further, 
Delalutin had then been on the market for 16 years and had been 
administered to hundreds of thousands of pregnant women without 
reports of any such effects (Tr.2043-2044). 
B. The Injuries Precipitating This Law Suit. 
Kathleen Barson, the mother of the plaintiff, first suspected 
she was pregnant while on a camping trip in the beginning of 
July, 1972 (Tr. 349). Shortly after Mrs. Barson's return to Utah 
on July 8 or 9, she contacted the office of Dr. L. Spencer Parkinson, 
a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist in Logan and was given an 
appointment for August 4 (Tr.350, 366, 370). 
On July 25, 1972, Mrs. Barson experienced spotting (vaginal 
bleeding) which was of sufficient concern that she contacted Dr. 
Parkinson's office (Tr. 350); she had not experienced this in her 
other pregnancies (Tr.350). Dr. Parkinson's office made arrange-
ments for the doctor to see her on the next day (Tr. 338-351, 
367). Dr. Parkinson saw Kathleen Barson on July 26th and received 
information from her with regard to the commencement of her last 
menstural period (Tr. 378; D Ex. 804). The doctor's records 
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indicate that Mrs. Barson advised him that this period had commenced 
on June 1 (Id.). 
After determining that Mrs. Barson was pregnant and that she 
was spotting and cramping, Dr. Parkinson diagnosed a threatened 
abortion and administered 250 mg. of Delalutin intramuscularly 
(Tr. 339, 367, 378-381). This was appropriate obstetrical practice 
in July 1972, and Mrs. Barson's spotting stopped (Tr.360, 381). 
When Mrs. Barson returned on August 4, 1972 for her regular 
appointment, Dr. Parkinson took a complete history and did an 
examination (Tr. 353-356, 370-383). Dr. Parkinson found indica-
tions of additional spotting during the course of this examina-
tion and gave her annother injection of Delalutin (Tr. 344, 370, 
387; D. Ex. 804). 
Mrs. Barson's pregnancy continued uneventfully although she 
experienced another episode of spotting in October of 1972 and 
received a third injection of Delalutin (Tr.270, 345; D. Ex. 
804). The plaintiff, Elizabeth Ann Barson, was born on March 26, 
1973 with profound birth defects the most serious of which was 
amelia--the total absence of arms (Tr. 347, 371-372; D. Ex. 804). 
c. The Pre-trial and Trial Proceedings. 
On March 20, 1979 Elizabeth Ann Barson filed a civil complaint. 
The complaint was later amended to seek both compensatory and 
punitive damages for the birth defects she suffered, which were 
allegedly caused by the administration of Delalutin during the 
early pregnancy of her mother (R.16-22). Plaintiff alleged 
-10-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that Squibb was liable under the theories of negligence, breach 
of warranty and strict liability because it failed to properly 
test Delalutin and failed to warn that the drug was defective 
since its use by pregnant women during the first trimester of 
pregnancy increased the risk of birth defects. (R.16-22). The 
plaintiff did not allege or offer any proof that Delalutin was 
adulterated nor that the drug was defectively manufactured (Id.). 
In several in limine motions made prior to trial, Squibb 
sought to preclude the admission in evidence of the physician and 
patient package inserts which were mandated by the FDA more than 
five years after the use of Delalutin by the plaintiff's mother 
(PR. 33; R. 553-554; P .Ex. 10 (n) et seg). 11 Squibb noted that 
these FDA mandated warnings were hearsay when offered either for 
.. 
the proposition that Delalutin was defective or that the drug was 
responsible for the plaintiff's birth defects. Further these 
statements were not admissible under any exception to that rule. 
U.R.E. 63. Moreover, Squibb argued that even if these subse-
quently mandated warnings were admissible under the rules of 
evidence they should be excluded under U.R.E. 51 because they 
11 
The physician package insert at issue read in pertinent 
part: 
There is no adequate evidence that such use 
is effective [in the prevention of habitual 
abortion or to treat threatened abortion] and 
there is evidence of potential harm to the 
fetus when such drugs are given during the 
first four months of pregnancy (P.Ex. lO(q)). 
The patient package insert (P.Ex lO(t)) first mandated in 1978 
contained the same warning. 
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amounted to subsequent remedial conduct (PR.34-37; R.553-554). 
Squibb also asked the court to limit evidence on the question of 
efficacy since such evidence was irrelevant on the issue of 
liability (PR.62-64; Tr.263-266). 
After hearing arguments during the pretrial, the trial court 
instructed counsel for the plaintiff not to refer to subsequently 
mandated package inserts in his opening statement (PR.53-54). 
The court stated that the admissibility of these subsequent 
warnings would be addressed during the course of the trial after 
receipt of appropriate foundational evidence (PR.54). The judge 
declined Squibb's request to limit references to efficacy in the 
opening, but the court did caution that plaintiff's counsel 
risked reversal if introduction of the evidence was not appro-
priate (PR.74). During the course of the trial, the court per-
mitted the introduction of both classes of evidence causing 
substantial prejudice to Squibb and creating many of the errors 
complained of here. 
The trial, which commenced on September 1, 1981 and continued 
until October 1, 1981, consumed a total of 15 trial days. During 
the course of the entire trial, plaintiff's counsel and experts 
were unable to offer any study which demonstrated any specific 
association between the administration of Delalutin and the 
development of birth defects in animal or man. They relied, 
instead, on studies relating to different products and other 
inadmissible evidence in order to try to establish that Delalutin 
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caused the plaintiff's injuries (P.Ex. 58; Tr.718, 721, 823, 869, 
877, 890, 892, 1012-1018, 1863, 1929-1930, 2010, 2038). 
For example, Dr. Alan K. Done, a pediatrician, was permitted 
by the trial judge to testify as to world literature relating to 
progestational agents, using a sununary of the articles and extra-
polating data taken from them, over repeated objections of Squibb 
(Tr.722-725; P.Ex. 58). Much of this literature dealt with oral 
contraceptives and hormonal pregnancy tests--not Delalutin (Tr.825). 
Frequently, Dr. Done reinterpreted the data presented and came to 
conclusions that differed from those of the authors. He supported 
this by stating that the people .whose conclusions he was rein-
terpreting were answering "a different question than the one I 
have to answer for purposes of this Court" (Tr. 873). 
Dr. Dane's summary exhibit included within it Drug 
Experience Reports ( "DER' s" ) submitted by Squibb to the FDA 12 
(Tr.841; P.Ex. 58). No testimony was adduced from any witness 
indicating that DER's, which could include such items as letters 
from lawyers (Tr. 939), were the type of evidence reasonably 
relied upon by experts in forming opinions (Tr.935-942). Although 
the trial court refused to admit these DER's in evidence finding 
12 
DER's are anecdotal reports on drugs received by drug companies 
from multiple sources including physicians, pharmacists, lawyers 
and the general public (.Tr. 939}. The reports frequently do not 
assert that a particular drug caused a problem. At best, they 
relate the taking of a drug and contemporaneous or subsequent 
adverse reactions (Tr.938-940). Drug· companies, as required by 
law, forward these routinely to the FDA. 21 C.F.R. § 310.300 
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them to be hearsay and unreliable, the reports nevertheless were 
impermissibly summarized by Dr. Done and placed before the jury 
(Tr.842). 
The trial court, despite pleas from the defendant, erroneously 
permitted the question of Delalutin's efficacy to be placed in 
issue before the jury (PR.62-64, Tr.761-763). At the close of 
the plaintiff's case in chief, the trial court permitted the 
plaintiff to introduce as evidence on causation and product 
defect not only all of the package inserts which predated the 
administration of Delalutin to the plaintiff's mother, but also 
all inserts subsequent to that time and up to the date of trial. 
(D. Ex. lO(p), D.Ex. lO(t); Tr. 1194-1197, 1319, 1321-1325, 
1495-1496). 
The package inserts assumed a dominant role in the trial. 
These hearsay documents became in effect an absent governmental 
expert witness upon which the plaintiff's attorneys and experts 
repeatedly relied (Tr. 1053-1054). This took on yet greater 
importance in light of the failure to offer any direct evidence 
between the administration of Delalutin and the development of 
congenital anomalies. Virtually every Squibb representative 
called as an adverse witness by the plaintiff and every defense 
expert witness was improperly cross-examined by the plaintiff's 
counsel about the post-administration changes in the package 
inserts. This improper approach suggested that the FDA, this 
country's public health expert, disagreed with any witness 
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supporting either Delalutin's safety or efficacy (Tr. 1851, 1854, 
1856, 1864, 1988, 1989, 1990). Thus the issues of safety and 
efficacy, the latter of which should not have been placed before 
the jury in any case, were put before the jury in an extremely 
prejudicial manner. 
Addressing both the issue of Delalutin's safety and efficacy, 
as well as the credibility of plaintiff's experts, the plaintiff's 
attorney in rebuttal summation repeatedly used these FDA-mandated 
warnings suggesting their "truth:" 
I cannot believe that by continually repeating 
some facts that somehow the truth of the 
assertion of Squibb can be believed by this 
jury. It certainly wasn't believed ~ the 
FDA .... All of the information that they've 
tried to show you was certainly shown to 
those agencies or to those organizations .... 
Everything that Squibb had they showed, but 
in spite of that what came out as revised 
May 1979? . . . On the Squibb symbol ... on 
the insert . . . [is] . . . "Warning . . . use of 
progestational agents during the first four 
months of pregnancy is not reconunended .... " 
[T]hey say Dr. Nora is silly, ignorant, not 
to be believed .... The FDA accepted it .... 
What they say is "progestational agents have 
been used with the beginning of the first 
trimester of pregnancy in an attempt to 
prevent habitual abortion or treat threatened 
abortion. There is no adequate evidence that 
such use is effective and there is evidence 
of potential harm to the fetus when such 
drugs are given during the first four months 
of pregnancy." [Tr.2561-2563] 
He then pointed out that the same language exists in the 
inserts today, adding: 
That's what it says, and it still says 
it, and it's still on the inserts to this day 
and it has not been removed, ... This is in 
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May of 1979 and it still exists and it hasn't 
been changed. If it were so clear ... [that 
there was no] ... significant relationship or 
incidence between Delalutin and limb defects, 
you can bet your bottom dollar that this 
still wouldn't be there, if that were a fact. 
Pardon me if I shout too much and get 
too excited, but this is important. It may 
be important to Squibb, but it's important to 
the children too, it's important to the 
public, it's important enough for the FDA to 
in the last paragraph of this warning that 
I've been reading say that if the patient is 
exposed to Delalutin during the first four 
months of pregnancy or if she becomes pregnant 
while taking this drug she should be apprised 
of the potential risk to the fetus. It says 
it straight out, 1979. [Tr.2563] 
The error of injecting the FDA into the case as an absent 
expert was compounded when the attorney for the plaintiff, in 
closing, accused Squibb of selling both unsafe and ineffective 
drugs. The attorney, after first stating that Squibb was "spending 
thousands of dollars defending lawsuits and this lawsuit" rather 
than making their product safe, asked a rhetorical question 
suggesting there was a "positive obligation of the company to 
come in here with positive proof [that Delalutin was safe]" 
(Tr.2569-2570; emphasis added). Squibb objected to this improper 
attempt to alter the burden of proof and the court sustained the 
objection. No curative instruction, however, was given (Tr.2570). 
Squibb produced testimony from si~ outside experts and 
several expert employees in the firm and presented a strong case 
that Delalutin did not cause the plaintiff's injuries. 13 Evidence 
13 
Defendant offered in support of its position the testimonies 
of Drs. Gary Berger, a board certified practicing OB/Gyn from 
North Carolina, who is also board certified in preventive medicine, 
(Cont'd) 
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was also introduced that the dates the drug was administered 
demonstrated that the injuries suffered by the plaintiff could 
not have been caused by Delalutin, even if the drug was a teratogen, 
because the date of conception occurred too early in relation to 
the giving of this drug (Tr. 1534-1536, 1586, 1593-1594, 1724, 
1725 1 1780 I 1841, 1990 I 2172-21751 2208-2209 I 2264-2267 f 2286 f 
2288-2290, 2292). 14 Other evidence was introduced by Squibb 
which tended to establish that Delalutin had been properly tested 
prior to marketing and that the directions to the physician and 
the warnings contained in them in 1972 were complete in light 
of the state of scientific knowledge then available (Tr.1232-1233). 
Additionally, expert testimony was proffered that Delalutin was 
effective in preventing threatened abortion after Delalutin' s 
efficacy had been challenged by the plaintiff (Tr .1800-1845). 
13 (Cont'd) 
public health and epidemiology (Tr. 1510, et seq.); Dr. Robert 
Seegmiller, Ph.D. Professor of Zoology specializing in embryology 
at Brigham Young University (Tr. 1710, et seg.); Dr. Leonard 
Lerner, a former Squibb employee and endocrinologist from Jefferson 
Medical School, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Tr. 1888, et seq.); 
Dr. Robert Franklin, a practicing board certified obstetrician 
from Houston, Texas (Tr. 1795 et seq.); Dr. Robert L. Brent, a 
board certified pediatrician from Jefferson Medical School, 
Philadelphia and the editor of Teratology, the leading scientific 
publication in the field (Tr. 2241 et seg. ) ; and Dr. Widikund 
Lenz of Munster, Germany, perhaps the-world's foremost authority 
on teratology and the relationship between drugs and birth defects 
(Tr. 1725, 2142, et seg). 
14 
It was Squibb's position that the Delalutin was given after 
the limbs would have formed so that the total absence of arms 
necessarily meant that something other than the drug caused the 
injury. Although this facet of the trial is not directly involved 
in any of the issues on this appeal, Squibb mentions it here 
because it was an extremely close issue which might well be 
decided differently at a second trial. 
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Squibb requested directed verdicts pursuant to U.R.C.P. 50 
both at the close of the plaintiff's case (Tr.1462-1476, 2130) 
and after all the evidence had been received (Tr.2440-2442). One 
of the grounds for the directed verdict was the fact that there 
was no showing that animal teratology testing, even if undertaken, 
would have provided Squibb with any data hinting of the potential 
of Delalutin to cause limb reduction defects or, indeed, any 
teratological defects (Tr. 2442) . These motions were denied 
(Tr.2442). 
The court then discussed its legal instructions with counsel 
(Tr.2452-2467). Squibb requested that its Proposed Instruction lOA 
be submitted to the jury defining strict liability in a prescrip-
tion drug case (Tr.2581). As previously noted, the plaintiff 
neither claimed nor offered any proof that Squibb had manufactured 
an adulterated drug or that Delalutin was defectively manufactured; 
rather plaintiff claimed Squibb had failed to provide adequate 
warnings in light of the scientific knowledge available in July 1972 
(Tr.2594). Thus any liability in the case could only be predicated 
on the adequacy, or inadequacy, of the warnings in view of the 
existing state of the art. Proposed Instruction lOA contained 
this limitation (R. ). 
The court declined to limit the liability issue to the 
adequacy of the warnings and instead submitted a general charge 
on strict liability and breach of warranty to the jury (R.1279-1280, 
1287). The court's instruction permitted the jury to find the 
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defendant liable if: (1) the manufacturer was engaged in the 
business of manufacturing and selling the drug; (2) the drug 
reached the user without substantial change; and (3) the drug 
caused the injury. The trial court's other instructions further 
reinforced the conclusion that a jury should find for the plaintiff 
if it was established that Delalutin was responsible for the 
injuries regardless of the adequacy of the warning or the state 
of scientific knowledge (R.1288-1289). The defendant objected to 
these instructions and also objected to the trial judge's failure 
to charge the jury in the specific language of Squibb's Proposed 
Request lOA {Tr.2581). 
·The court submitted the case to the jury on all three of 
plaintiff's liability theories, namely, negligence, breach of 
warranty and strict liability (R.1279-1280. In argument to the 
jury plaintiff's counsel made it clear that he was relying upon 
_all three theories (Tr. 2471-2472). The jury, after deliberating 
returned a. verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the 
defendant in the amount of $1,500,000 (Tr. 2585). Since the 
verdict was general in form, it cannot be known upon what theory 
or theories the jury relied in finding their verdict (R. 1302). 
o. The Post Trial Proceedings. 
Following the verdict, Squibb moved pursuant to U.R.C.P. 
SO(b) and 59 for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and in 
the alternative for a new trial (R.1315-1317; Tr.2589). Squibb 
reasserted its position that the trial court erred in permitting 
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the plaintiff to introduce evidence of FDA mandated package 
inserts issued subsequent to the date Delalutin was administered 
to the plaintiff's mother (Tr.2597). Squibb also reiterated its 
objections to various evidentiary rulings of the court and to the 
jury Instructions (Tr.2593-2597). 
On December 11, 1981, the trial court denied the motions 
though recognizing that his ruling on the post-1972 inserts was 
pivotal: 
As to receiving package inserts after 
July, 1972, I admit this probably gave me the 
most problem during the course of the trial. 
[Tr.2630] 
The judge reserved decision on the motion for a new trial based 
upon newly discovered evidence pursuant to U.R.C.P. 60 {Tr.2631). 
on January 21, 1982, the trial court denied the defendant's 
motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence 
(R.1440-141). The basis for the motion was a meeting of the 
Fertility and Maternal Health Drugs Advisory Committee to the FDA 
on November 5 and 6, 1981. The Committee, composed of the leading 
authorities in the various fields of reproductive medicine, 
unanimously recommended that the pregnancy warnings related to 
progesterone and hydroxyprogesterone caproate (Delalutin) be 
withdrawn in light of the available medical evidence as to their 
safety and efficacy. Again, however, the court observed that the 
question of whether Delalutin was a teratogen was a very close 
question: 
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After one month of trial this court does 
not know whether Delalutin is teratogenic 
during the first trimester of pregnancy. The 
jury chose to believe those doctors who 
believed that it is. [R.1440] 
On February 22, 1982 Squibb filed its Notice of Appeal 
(R.1448). This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal pursuant to 
U.R.C.P. 72(a). In this appeal, Squibb seeks a new trial because 
of the following errors conuni tted by the trial court: ( 1) in 
admitting subsequent FDA-mandated physician and patient inserts; 
(2) in improperly instructing the jury with regard to the elements 
necessary to establish strict liability in tort and breach of 
warranty in a drug case; (3) in permitting the issue of negligence 
based on inadequate animal testing to be submitted to the jury; 
and ( 4) in committing other prejudicial errors concerning the 
admission of evidence and the conduct of the trial which resulted 
in the jury verdict from which this appeal is taken. Squibb also 
seeks a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FDA-MANDATED PACKAGE INSERTS ARE NOT 
ADMISSIBLE BASED UPON BOTH EVIDENTIARY AND 
POLICY GROUNDS. 
A. The Utah Rules of Evidence Forbid the Introduc-
tion of these FDA-Mandated Inserts Because They 
Are Hearsay and Not Admissible in Evidence 
Under Any Exception to U.R.E. 63. 
1. Introduction 
When the plaintiff's mother received Delalutin injections in 
July and August of 1972, no information had appeared in scientific 
publications which suggested any association between progestational 
agents generally and limb anomalies. In mid-1973, however, the 
FDA began receiving information which suggested that a question 
of safety was raised by inferential evidence between the administra-
tion of certain progestins and cardiac anomalies. 38 Fed. Reg. 
27948 (October 10, 1973). Based on this preliminary information, 
and fulfilling its role in the field of public health, the FDA 
directed that no progestational agents should be given to women 
during early pregnancy. Squibb complied with the FDA directions 
and all indications for use during pregnancy were deleted from 
its package inserts (P.Ex. lO(p)). 
Although Squibb did not market Delalutin for the prevention 
of habitual and threatened abortion after December 1973, the FDA, 
in July 1977, adopted additional regulations respecting package 
inserts which contain the warnings introduced in evidence during 
this case ( P. Ex. 10 ( q); P. Ex. 10 ( s) ) . In mandating that al 1 
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all drug companies marketing progestational agents provide certain 
warnings in their package inserts, the FDA acknowledged that "it 
[was] not possible to draw a cause and effect relationship" 
between Delalutin and birth defects. Report on Labeling Require-
ments for Progestational Drugs (October, 1977) at 4. 15 Nor did 
the FDA find that Delalutin was an ineffective drug (Id. at 4-5). 
When the FDA published the final regulations on requirements 
for patient labeling on progestational drug products in October 
1978, the Commissioner of Food and Drugs reiterated that no cause 
and effect relationship had been established between the taking 
of Delalutin and birth defects. Specifically, the Commissioner 
noted: 
15 
Although it is not possible to draw ~ cause 
and effect relationship with progesterone or 
hydroxyprogesterone [Delalutin] based on 
these data, they do raise an element of 
suspicion. A considerably larger study would 
be required in order to rule out a positive 
The FDA' s Obstetrics and Gynecology Advisory Committee in 
fact recommended that progesterone and hydroxyprogesterone not be 
included in the warning. The January 10, 1977 FDC Report ("Pink 
Sheet") observed: 
PROGESTERONES SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM PROGESTAGEN BOX 
WARNING was consensus of F.D.A's OB/Gyn Advisory Comte. 
[sic] Jan. 6, at a meeting where Associate Dir. for New 
Drug evaluation, Marion J. Finkel, M. D. submitted 
proposed labeling warning to Comte. members 
[Tr. 1884] 
The OB/Gyn Advisory Group of the FDA has never indicated 
that Delalutin was not efficacious (Tr. 1882). 
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relationship. (43 Fed. Reg. 47178 (October 13, 
1978); emphasis added][l6] 
Squibb complied with FDA directions in 1977 with respect to 
physician package inserts and again in 1978 with respect to 
patient package inserts (P.Ex. lO(s), lO(t)). In both instances 
language used in these warnings was mandated and approved by the 
FDA (P. Ex. lO(s)). These inserts were in use at the time of 
trial (P.Ex. lO(q)). 
Recently, the FDA Committee responsible for evaluating the 
efficacy and safety of drugs used in pregnancy (including proges-
terone and Delalutin) has reconunended changes to the mandated 
package insert for Delalutin· to modify the warnings the plaintiff 
introduced into evidence (Tr.2610-2612, 2625). Specifically, the 
Cornmi ttee found that "the amended label should indicate that 
progesterone and ... [Delalutin] ... do not appear to have any 
significant teratogenic potential and the current labeling 
16 
In that same Federal Register Notice the FDA acknowledged 
receipt of comments which noted "certain characteristics of 
progesterone and hydroxyprogesterone ... [Delalutin] ... that 
distinguished these drugs from the other progestional drug products 
and warrant excluding progesterone and hydroxyprogesterone from 
the warning about teratogenic risk. 11 43 Fed. Reg. 47178 (October 
13, 1978). The FDA out of caution, however, concluded: 
[T]here is not sufficient evidence to permit 
the exclusion of any of the progestational 
drug products from the patient labeling 
requirements .... [at this time]. If more 
information becomes available, that can be 
relied upon to distinguish within the class, 
certain progestational drug products may be 
exempted from the patient labeling require-
ments. [43 Fed. Reg. 47179 (October 13, 1978)] 
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suggesting teratogenic potential of sex hormones, [should] 
be modified. 11 (Minutes of November 5-6, 1981 Meeting "Fertility 
and Maternal Heal th Drugs Advisory Cornrni ttee, " Food and Drug 
Ad.ministration ( 11 FDA Fertility Committee Minutes") at 17; Tr.2610-
2612, 2625). The FDA currently has its Conunittee's reconunendation 
under advisement. (Tr.2614) 
As we noted previously, a substantial part of the plaintiff's 
case rested on evidence of Squibb's subsequent FDA-mandated 
precautionary package inserts for the drug Delalutin. These 
package inserts warned physicians and patients that Delalutin had 
not been shown to be effective in preventing miscarriages and 
that some studies suggested the danger of birth defects, including 
limb defects, when pregnant women used progestins in the first 
four months of pregnancy (P.Ex. lO(q) et seq.). 
The relationship between the FDA' s formal statements on 
Delalutin and other progestational agents and the plaintif.f' s 
injuries is not at all clear. The basis for the FDA's conclusion 
was not explored at the trial. The package inserts served as a 
disembodied expert witness, not subject to cross-examination. 
Although various rationales were offered for the acceptance of 
these documents, it is evident that the plaintiff offered them 
for their 11 truth"--i.e. Delalutin could cause birth defects--and 
they were admitted into evidence by the court for that purpose 
(Tr.1195-1196, 1297-1998, 1495-1496). Since these statements 
were presented to the jury as judgments by the FDA that Delalutin 
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caused the plaintiff's injuries, they were hearsay evidence and 
inadmissible except as provided in exceptions to U.R.E. 63. 18 
Because hearsay evidence is not subject to cross-examination, any 
exceptions permitting its admission must be based upon a deter-
mination that its trustworthiness and value significantly outweigh 
the loss to the fact-finding process suffered when the right to 
confrontation is eliminated. Cf. State v. Kendrick, 538 P.2d 313 
{Utah 1975}; U.R.E. 63; 5 Wigmore, Evidence ~ 1365 {Chadbourne 
Rev. 1974). As will be shown, such guarantees do not exist here. 
2. The FDA-Mandated Inserts Are Not Reports and Findings 
of Public Officials Under U.R.E. 63(15} 
In Utah the reports and findings of public officials are 
hearsay evidence and inadmissible except: 
Subject to . . . [notice, ] factual data 
contained in written reports or findings of 
fact made by a public official of the United 
States or of a state or territory of the 
United States, if the judge finds that the 
making thereof was within the scope of the 
duty of such official and that it was his 
duty {a) to perform the act reported, or 
{b) to observe the act, condition or event 
reported, or { c) to investigate the facts 
concerning the act, condition or event and to 
make findings or draw conclusion based on 
such investigation. [U.R.E. 63 (15); emphasis 
added] 
By its terms, U.R.E. 63 (15) does not permit receipt of these 
package inserts because they do not represent factual data, but 
18 
The trial judge never actually advised the litigants under 
what exception to the hearsay rule he was permitting their introduc-
tion. Compare Tr.1193-1197, 1495-1496 with PR.SO. 
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rather opinions by a public body. This Court has held that 
receipt of reports containing such opinions is beyond the scope 
of the rule. See Bridges v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 488 P.2d 
738, 740 (Utah 1971); Wilson v. Guaranteed Securities Co., 23 
P.2d 921, 923-924 (Utah 1933); Continental Nat. Bank v. Naylor, 
179 P. 67, 71 (Utah 1919). See also City of Stockton v. Vote 244 
P. 609, 620-622 (Cal. App. 1926). 
In Bridges v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 488 P.2d at 740, this 
Court clearly differentiated between public reports presenting 
factual data and those containing opinions. In that case the 
plaintiffs had sought to introduce an order of the Utah Public 
Service Commission directing that improvements be made at a grade 
crossing where the plaintiff's son had been killed. In sustaining 
the trial court's order excluding this evidence the Court observed: 
Under Rule 63 (15), U.R.E., a report of 
finding of a public official such as the 
order of the Public Service-Commission is 
deemed admissible in evidence. However, the 
explanatory note states: 
. . . it is not designed to permit 
the admission of a judgment or 
finding of fact of the court or 
administrative body for the purpose 
of proving the matters upon which 
such judgment or finding of fact 
were based. [T]his exception ~ 
not designed to admit opinions or 
conclusions of officials appearing 
in official reports, but only the 
admissions of statements of fact 
appearing therein. [Bridges, 488 
P.2d at 740; emphasis added] 
The result reached in Bridges is indicative of a consistent 
policy in State and Federal courts that while factual findings by 
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• 
public officials themselves may be admitted, conclusions of those 
officials should not. In Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 
637 F.2d 87, 94 {2d Cir. 1980), the Second Circuit directly faced 
the question of whether FDA mandated warnings were admissible 
pursuant to the Federal "public records" exception, Fed. R. Evid. 
803{8)(C). 19 The plaintiff in Lindsay sought to introduce, on 
the issue of causation, similar types of FDA mandated physician 
and patient warnings for oral contraceptives. In specifically 
rejecting the admission of this evidence as a hearsay exception 
the court observed: 
[I]nsofar as the labeling changes may be said 
to 'reflect' FDA conclusions, they do not 
fall readily within the public record hearsay 
exception . . . since they deal with medical 
opinions not facts. [Lindsav v. Ortho Pharma-
ceutical~., 637 F.2d at 94] 
Similarly, in City of New York v. Pullman, Inc., 662 F.2d 
910 {2d Cir. 1981), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals refused 
to permit receipt of a staff report of the Urban Mass Transit 
Administration ( "UMTA 11 ) commenting on the safety of a repair 
procedure for undercarriages on New York City subway cars. 
Although the court recognized that the governmental agency had a 
mandated duty to investigate unsafe conditions where Federal 
19 
Fed. R. Ev id. 803 { 8) { c) permits the receipt of "records, 
reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public 
offices or agencies, setting forth ... {C) in civil actions and 
proceedings ... factual findings resulting from an investigation 
made pursuant to authority rendered by law, unless the sources of 
information or circumstances indicate the lack of trustworthiness" 
(Emphasis added). 
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financing of subway cars was involved, it rejected the findings 
of this Federal agency as appropriate evidence in a products 
liability case. The judges worried that the report "would have 
been presented to the jury in an 'aura of special reliability and 
trustworthiness' which would have not been commensurate with its 
actual reliability." City of New York v. Pullman, .!!!£., 662 F.2d 
at 915. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co., 505 
F.Supp. 1125, 1147-1150 (E.D. Pa. 1980). 
Similar concerns about the reliability of information con-
tained in government reports have caused Federal trial courts to 
reject conclusions of government fact-finders because these 
findings and conclusions involved opinions based upon scientific 
facts which were in the process of evolution and were therefore 
not reliable. See Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 518 F.Supp. 
1387 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Zenith v. Matsushita Electric Industrial 
Co., 505 F.Supp. at 1148-1150. 
This is precisely the case here. These mandated post-
administration package inserts reflect the FDA's opinions and not 
its factual findings. The agency made its judgments based upon 
incomplete data which suggested that there might be an association 
between progestational agents and birth defects. The FDA, in its 
capacity as a guardian of the public heal th, is called upon to 
make judgments based on the evolving state of medical knowledge 
and to act based on these incomplete data. Courts, on the other 
hand, must address questions of defining true cause and effect 
based on verified data with accompanying indicia of reliability. 
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3. The FDA-Mandated Inserts Are Not Adoptive Admissions 
Under U.R.E. 63(8) 
The trial judge correctly recognized that statements mandated 
by governmental agencies such as the FDA could not constitute 
admissions by Squibb (PR.SO}. Nevertheless, the introduction of 
the package inserts was defend~d by the plaintiff in later proceed-
ings on that basis (Tr.2561-2563). 
In State v. Carlsen, 638 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah 1981), cert. 
denied, U.S. I 102 s.ct. 1469 (1982), this Court 
----
recognized that an adoptive admission by a party, pursuant to 
U.R.E. 63(8), should be found only where the individual or entity 
against which the admission is offered has had a meaningful 
opportunity and interest in confronting or denying it. These 
opportunities and interests were not present in this case. 
The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 352, 
355 ( e), provides the FDA with plenary power respecting drug 
package inserts. Any drug manufacturer declining to follow FDA 
labeling directives is subject to regulatory action which may 
include: seizure of the drug product, injunctive action or criminal 
sanctions. 21 U. S . C . § § 3 31 ( c ) - { d) , 3 3 2 ( a ) , 3 3 3 , 3 3 4 . The 
Second Circuit, in recognizing that power, found it particularly 
inappropriate to consider labeling changes by drug companies as 
admissions against them. Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical .£2.!:E,., 
637 F.2d 87 {2d Cir. 1980). Rather, the court found that "[i]n 
view of the control over label terminology exercisable by the FDA 
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... we question whether a change in language should be construed 
as a voluntary admission by the manufacturer." Id., 637 F. 2d at 
94. See also, Vockie v. General Motors~., 66 F.R.D. 57, 60-62 
{E.D.Pa.), aff'd 523 F.2d 1052 {3d Cir. 1975); International Paper 
Co. v. Delaware~ H.R. Corp., 73 F.Supp. 30, 35 {N.D.N.Y. 1938). 
The rationale justifying an adoptive admission·is entirely 
missing when statements are made under the direction of a regula-
tory body. This is so because the statements themselves are not 
voluntary and therefore the alleged declarant's adoption of them 
is open to substantial doubt. In International Paper Co. v. 
Delaware & H.R. ~., 73 F.Supp. at 35, the district judge 
recognized that the defendant's use of a tariff rate symbol 
mandated by the Interstate Commerce Commission could not be 
regarded as an adoptive admission, finding: 
20 
This alleged change is not in the nature 
of an admission for an admission is something 
voluntarily said or perhaps done. 
Where, as here, the person charged with 
the alleged admission is compelled to use the 
sYI!1bol in question £y the requirements of 
public policy, whether he will .2.I not, it 
loses its character ~ ~ voluntary act and 
therefore loses any force it might otherwise 
have as an admission. (73 F.Supp. at 35; 
emphasis added][20] 
Farner v. Paccar, Inc., 562 F.2d 518 {8th Cir. 1977), a case 
which was cited in support of the plaintiff's position during 
post-trial motions, did pernti t the introduction of a recall 
letter mandated under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle 
Safety Act. The basis for the introduction of that recall letter, 
however, was that it was affirmatively adopted by one of the 
defendant's engineers who had previously discussed the design 
problems identified by the government. Additionally, other 
substantial evidence existed which permitted the introduction of 
the recall le~ter as an admission. 
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The difficulty in viewing these mandated warnings as admis-
sions is compounded when the purported adoption is based upon 
silence. In numerous Federal cases interpreting Fed. R. Evid. 
80l{d)(2)(C), a rule strikingly similar to U.R.E. 63(8), courts 
have found that to establish an admission by silence the proponent 
must demonstrate not only that a party has heard the accusation 
but also that "the circumstances are such that dissent would in 
ordinary experience have been expressed if the conununication had 
not been correct." Unite.d States v. Flecha, 539 F.2d 874 at 877 
(2d Cir. 1976), quoting 4 Wigmore, Evidence § 1071 (Chadbourne 
Rev. 1972)); Zenith Radio~· v. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co., 505 
F.Supp. at 1243-1245. 21 
What is apparent from a review of this record is that the 
FDA never made affirmative factual findings that Delalutin caused 
birth defects. Rather, the FDA acknowledged that no cause and 
21 
During the course of argument whether these warnings should 
be permitted in evidence, counsel for the plaintiff suggested 
that Squibb could have disclaimed its belief in the accuracy of 
the mandated warnings by adopting labeling similar to that which 
is contained on cigarette packaging--"Warning: The Surgeon 
General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to 
Your Health." (Tr.1323) Elemental research discloses that the 
warning mandated on cigarette packages is specifically governed 
by Section 4 of the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 
15 u.s.c. § 1333. That statute makes it "unlawful for any person 
to manufacture ... any cigarette the package of which fails to 
bear the following statement: 'Warning: The Surgeon General Has 
Determined that Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health.'" 
The subsequent section, 15 U.S. C. § 1334, provides that "No 
statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement 
required by § 1333 of this type shall be required on any cigarette 
package." For a brief review of other mandated warnings on 
cigarette labeling, see Brown ~ Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. 
Engman, 1975-2 CCH Trade Cas. ~ 60,607 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 1975). 
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effect relationship had been established between Delalutin and 
possible birth defects. 43 Fed. Reg. 47178 (Oct. 13, 1978). 
Moreover, the record reveals that indications for use in pregnancy 
had been withdrawn in 1973 (P.Ex. lO(m)). Since the mandated 
warnings pertained to an indication for which the drug had not 
been marketed for four years, Squibb also had no incentive, 
reason, or, indeed, standing in 1977 to dispute the imposition of 
the mandated warnings which in effect pertained to a drug use for 
which Delalutin was not marketed in 1977. 
Finally, as we have noted, the information contained in the 
mandated inserts introduced at trial was not only hearsay but was 
also largely non-factual in nature (P.Ex.lO(t)). The inserts 
summarize judgments reported in medical periodicals suggesting an 
association, based on limited statistical data, between the 
taking of some progestogins during early pregnancy and an increased 
risk of birth defects. The introduction of these FDA warnings in 
evidence when they themselves incorporate additional hearsay, 
raises other evidentiary questions which further mandate their 
exclusion under Utah law. 
In Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533 (Utah 1981), this court 
observed that Utah had not adopted the learned treatise rule when 
it enacted its evidence code. The receipt of the contents of these 
medical articles contained in the FDA mandated warnings raises the 
spectre of multiple hearsay, some of which is inadmissible because 
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it is in the nature of an absent expert's opinion. 22 Cf. U.R.E. 66 
and 63(31) (the learned treatise rule which was not adopted). 
In short then, none of the predicates for the receipt of 
this evidence as an admission exist. Moreover, none of the 
policies served by the admission of such evidence are furthered. 
Rather, it appears that the receipt of this evidence would violate 
many of the policies prominent in this State's evidence rules. 
The trial judge clearly declined to admit these inserts as admis-
sions. This court should also decline any post trial invitation 
to admit them on that basis. 
B. The Policy Which Precludes Admission of 
Subsequent Remedial Measures Pursuant to 
U.R.E. 51 Renders These Mandated FDA 
Warnings Inadmissible. 
The strong public policy underlying the exclusion of hearsay 
is not the only policy militating against admission of these FDA 
mandated warnings. A drug company's enforced compliance with the 
FDA' s mandates in the form of changed labeling is a form of 
remedial measure. U.R.E. 51 guarantees that modifying drug 
labeling or taking other remedial measures will not be admissible 
as proof of a breach of duty: 
22 
When after the occurrence of an event 
remedial or precautionary measures are taken, 
which, if taken previously would have tended 
to make the event less likely to occur, 
evidence of such subsequent measures is not 
admissible to prove negligence or culpable 
conduct in connection with the event. 
State v. Clayton, No. 82-17518 (Utah 1982) (Slip Opinion) 
does not alter the ruling in Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d at 533. 
The FDA warnings were not relied upon by the plaintiff's experts, 
but were instead introduced in evidence for their truth. See 
Coulter v. Stewart, 642 P.2d 602 (N.M. 1982). 
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U.R.E. 51 was adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in 1971 and 
reflects this State's continued adherence to the common law rule 
that evidence of subsequent remedial or precautionary measures is 
inadmissible to demonstrate that the defendant was negligent, the 
condition was previously unsafe, or that the defendant admitted 
its culpability in taking those steps. See Potter v. Dr. W.H. 
-- --
Groves Latter-Day Saints Hospital, 103 P.2d 280, 282 (Utah 1940); 
Nielsen v. Christensen-Gardner, Inc., 38 P.2d 743, 745 (Utah 
1934); Christensen v. Utah Rapid Transit Co., 27 P.2d 468, 474 
(Utah 1933). This policy, which has remained in effect for over 
50 years, endorses 
[t]he general rule that where a dangerous or 
defective appliance is alleged to have resulted 
in an injury for which damges are sought to 
be recovered, evidence that subsequent to the 
accident changes or repairs thereof or thereto 
were made is inadmissible to show antecedent 
negligence or as an admission of negligence 
on the particular occasion in question .... 
45 c. J. 1232. [ Christenson v. Utah Rapid 
Transit Co., 27 P.2d at 474][23] 
The Utah Rules of Evidence in effect today also recognize 
that evidence of subsequent precautions often has little to do 
with the issue of whether a product was in fact harmful in the 
first place. This Court has on occasion defined the evidence 
question raised in U.R.E. 51 as one of relevance: 
23 
The Corpus Juris section approved by the court in Christenson 
specifically states that "evidence of such repairs or changes 
made or precautions taken is not admissible to show the dangerous 
character of a place, method, or appliance at the time of the 
accident .... " 45 C.J. 1234-1235. 
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The fact that some months after appel-
lant's injury respondent added to its instruc-
tions for the use of its products the employ-
ment of rubber gloves does not establish or 
tend to establish knowledge of the danger at 
the time of injury or that any ingredient was 
then harmful. [Bennett v. Pilot Products 
co., 235 P.2d 525, 527 (Utah 1951); emphasis 
added] 
The plaintiff argued at trial that this exclusionary rule 
should not apply because fault or culpability is not an issue in 
a strict liability case. This premise ignors the fact that the 
theory of liability presented to the jury in this case involved a 
failure to warn of known or reasonably knowable dangers. 
The Restatement of Torts (2d) § 402A, which deals with the 
concept of strict liability, has been adopted by Utah. Mulherin 
v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981); Ernest~- Hahn, 
Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979). 24 In Mulherin 
v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d at 1303-04, this Court while 
affirming its adherence to the Restatement also found that compara-
tive negligence principles were applicable in strict liability 
cases to diminish recovery by a plaintiff. It ruled that while 
there might "be semantic difficulties in comparing strict liability 
and negligence ... we believe that judges and juries will have no 
difficult in assigning the relative responsibility each is to 
24 
The Utah Supreme Court specifically adopted Comments g and 
n to § 402A which provide defenses to strict liability charges. 
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bear for a particular injury when the ultimate issues in such 
comparison are relative fault and relative causation. 11 Mulherin 
v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d at 1304. A review of these two 
recent products liability cases shows that Utah does not equate 
strict liability with absolute liability. Neither, of course, 
does the Restatement, particularly when dealing with drug products. 
The Restatement of Torts (2d) § 402A dramatically differenti-
ates between liability standards to be applied in cases involving 
drug products and those involving commercial products generally. 
As discussed in Point II, infra, where adequacy of the warning is 
at issue, the duty 11 is one of reasonable care, regardless of 
whether the theory pled is negligence, implied warranty, or 
strict liability in tort." Smith v. E. R. Squibb~ Sons, Inc., 
273 N.W.2d 476, 479-480 (Mich. 1979). 
It is clear, then, that if this court continues its adherence 
to the principles in the Restatement of Torts (2d) § 402A and 
adopts Comments h, j and k, Squibb's duty to warn will be measured 
by traditional concepts of negligence. Therefore, by its terms 
U.R.E. 51 would be applicable to this case. 
While we believe that this Court will adopt Comments h, j 
and k as the law in this State (see Point II, infra), the Court 
should not get the misimpression that the policy expressed in 
U.R.E. 51 is inapplicable where strict liability is involved. 
Al though no Utah decision has dealt with the application of 
U.R.E. 51 in a strict liability case, ample precedent, both in 
other States having similar exclusionary rules and in the Federal 
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courts under Fed. R. Evid. 407 {a rule similar to U.R.E. 51), 
demonstrates that the policies expressed in U. R. E. 51 should 
apply to strict liability. 
In Werner v. Upjohn Co., Inc., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), 
cert. denied 449 U.S. U.S. 1080 (1981), a plaintiff's judgment in 
a drug products case was reversed because a subsequently revised 
and expanded warning distributed with the prescription drug 
Cleocin, an antibiotic associated with the side effect of severe 
diarrhea, was improperly admitted into evidence to prove that an 
earlier warning was inadequate. The court found that the revised 
insert was a remedial measure protected by Fed. R. Evid. 407. 25 
Id. at 853. 
25 
Fed. R. Evid. 407 provides that: 
When after an event, measures are taken 
which, if taken previously, would have made 
the event less likely to occur, evidence of 
the subsequent measures is not admissible to 
prove negligence or culpable conduct in 
connection with the event. This rule does 
not require the exclusion of evidence of sub-
sequent measures when offered for another 
purpose, such as proving ownership, control, 
or feasibility of precautionary measures, if 
controverted, or impeachment. 
According to the Notes of the Advisory Committee on the Pro-
posed Federal Evidence Rules, Rule 407 rests on two grounds: 
(1) The conduct is not in fact an admission, 
since the conduct is equally consistent with 
injury by mere accident or through contributory 
negligence .... (2~ The other, and~ impressive, 
ground for exclusion rests 2.!! ~ social policy 
of en~ouraging people to take, or at least 
not discouraging them from taking, steps in 
furtherance of added safety .... [56 F.R.D. 
183 at 225-226 (1973); emphasis added] 
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The Werner court specifically rejected plaintiff's argument 
that the subsequent warning regarding Cleocin should be admissible 
.because the complaint included a "strict liability" claim. The 
plaintiff argued that strict liability claims are not covered by 
the phrase "negligence or culpable conduct" in Fed. R. Evid. 407. 
The court, however, took a broader view of this term. The Federal 
appeals court found that the issue in a failure to warn case was 
the same whether the theory was negligence or strict liability--
was the warning adequate? 
Under a negligence theory the issue is whether 
the defendant exercised due care in formulating 
and updating the warning, while under a 
strict liability theory the issue is whether 
the lack of a proper warning made the product 
unreasonably dangerous. Though phrased 
differently the issue under either theory is 
essentially the ~: was the warning adequate? 
[Werner Vo Upjohn Co., Inc., 628 F.2d at 858; 
emphasis added] 
The Fourth Circuit concluded that to admit evidence of sub-
sequent remedial measures in a failure to warn case involving an 
unavoidably dangerous drug "would promote substance over form" 
and would subvert the policy behind excluding evidence of subse-
quent remedial measures. Werner v. Upjohn Co., Inc., 628 F.2d at 
858. Using the same reasoning, it also rejected the plaintiff's 
pr~f fer of a subsequent warning to prove breach of an express 
warranty, to prove causation, or to show that the plaintiff was 
entitled to punitive damages: 
(W]e hold, for the same reasons stated in our 
refusal to allow the 1975 warning to come in 
to prove strict liability, that the policy 
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behind Rule 407 does not allow for a new 
exception to prove-c~ation, b--re-ach . o~ 
express warranty 2E entitlement to punitive 
damages on the facts of this case. (628 F.2d 
at 858-859; emphasis added] 
The court acknowledged plaintiff's argument, that the policy 
behind Fed. R. Evid. 407 would not be served by excluding the 
evidence since the subsequent warning was required by the FDA, 
had a "surface plausibility. 11 According to the court, however, 
the argument overlooked the dual responsibility for preparing 
warnings for prescription drugs. Werner, 628 F.2d at 859. 
In addition to the FDA' s broad regulatory sanctions, the 
agency relies on the free exchange of information from physicians 
and pharmaceutical companies relating to the experience gained in 
the clinical use of drugs together with voluntary compliance and 
open discussion in determining the content of warnings and adver-
tising for prescription drugs. 628 F.2d at 859. Furthermore, 
FDA regulations allow drug companies to change the labels and 
warnings accompanying their products without prior FDA approval 
where new side effects are discovered by the company. 21 C.F.R. 
§ 314.8(d)-(e). 
The appellate court reasoned that if subsequent warnings 
were admitted simply because either the FDA required, or might 
have required the change, then drug companies would be discouraged 
from taking early action on their own and from fully participating 
in voluntary compliance procedures. Werner, 628 F.2d at 859. It 
concluded that the FDA's regulatory power should not be viewed as 
conflicting with the protective policy of Fed. R. Evid. 407: 
-40-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The FDA's regulations and policies encourage 
early unilateral action by the drug companies 
to improve their warnings, and Rule 407 
promotes the same goal. We therefore hold 
that FDA regulations in the area of drug 
labeling do not require a new exception to 
Rule 407. Indeed, to find such an exception 
would subvert the policy goals of both Rule 407 
and FDA Regulations 314.8(d)-(e). [Werner, 
628 F.2d at 860; emphasis added] 
Federal courts in virtually every circuit have agreed with 
the Werner case and have applied Fed. R. Evid. 407 to exclude 
subsequent remedial conduct in cases based on strict liability. 26 
The policy expressed in Werner that subsequently mandated warnings 
are inappropriate evidence when offered to establish causation is 
also in agreement with the overwhelming majority of State courts 
26 
Roy v. Star Chopper Co., Inc., 584 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 1978) 
cert. denied 440 U. s. 116 ( 1979) (evidence of post-accident 
repairs to machine excluded under Fed. R. Evid. 407 in strict 
liability case); Cann v. Ford Motor Company, 658 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 
1981), cert. denied. __ U.S. __ , 102 S.Ct. 2036 (1982) (proffer 
rejected of subsequent modification of auto transmission design 
and amendment of owner's manual); Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical 
£2!:E_., 637 F.2d at 92-94 (admission of subsequent FDA - mandated 
package inserts required reversal of the plaintiff's judgment 
under Fed. R. Evid. 407, among other reasons); Knight v. Otis 
Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (evidence of subsequent 
repair to-elevator excluded under Fed. R. Evid. 407); Bauman v. 
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 621 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1980) 
(reversal required because of admission into evidence of subsequent 
changes in design of door latch); Oberst v. International Harvester 
Co., Inc., 640 F.2d 863 (7th cir. 1980) (evidence of post-accident 
change in bunk restraint for truck sleeping compartment excluded 
in strict liability case). 
Among federal courts, only the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals has found the exclusionary rule inapplicable in strict 
liability cases. Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Associ-
ation, 552 F.2d 78 (8th Cir. 1977). However, the Utah Supreme 
Court has previously rejected the Eighth Circuit's no-fault 
approach to strict liability which is reflected in Melia v. Ford 
Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1975). See Mulherin v. Ingersoll-
Rand Co., 628 P.2d at 1304. 
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which have rules similar to U.R.E. 51 and which have considered 
h . . 27 t is issue. 
Emblematic of the reasoning employed by these State courts 
is the decision in Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 
N.E.2d 541 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979). There the Indiana appellate 
court was faced with a case almost identical to this one. Chapman, 
the plaintiff, had sued the drug company for personal injuries 
suffered as a result of her taking an oral contraceptive manufac-
tured by the company. The complaint, which alleged strict tort 
liability under the Restatement as well as breach of warranty and 
negligence, charged that Ortho had failed to adequately warn of 
the increased risk of blood clotting associated with the use of 
its oral contraceptives. 
27 
Ortho Pharmaceutical ~· v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1979) (excluding drug warnings); Smith v. E.R. Squibb~ 
Sons, Inc., 273 N.W.2d 476 (Mich. 1979) (Michigan Evidence Rule, 
patterned on Fed. R. Evid. 407, invoked to exclude from evidence 
the fact that warnings packaged with the drug Renografin - 60, a 
die injected into the veins of x-ray patients, had been made more 
explicit in the years following the injury alleged to be attributed 
to the drug); Price v. Buckingham Mfg. Co., Inc., 266 A.2d 140 
(N.J. App. Div. 1970) (modification of seat belt snap not admissible 
in action alleging defect in belt); E. G. LaMonica v. Outboard 
Marine Corp. , 355 N. E. 2d 533 (Ohio l976); Simms v. Southeast 
Texas Methodist Hospital, 535 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) 
{subsequent drug package warning and FDA regulation excluded as 
evidence of causation: 11 admission of evidence of subsequent 
precautionary or safety measures for the purpose of establishing 
causation would discourage the taking of remedial measures after 
the accident as effectively as will the reception of such evidence 
on the issue of negligence"); Hayson v. Coleman Lantern Co., 
Inc., 573 P.2d 785 {Wash. 1978) (evidence of post-accident Changes 
and instructions for using Coleman stove excluded in strict 
liability case); Krueger v. Tappan Co., 311 N.W.2d 219 (Wisc. Ct. 
App. 1981) (evidence of subsequent warnings regarding the use of 
stove excluded in strict liability case). 
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The Indiana court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the 
rule proscribing the admission of subsequent remedial conduct is 
unnecessary in strict liability cases. In addition to endorsing 
the policy of encouraging subsequent remedial measures the court 
found that exclusion of such conduct is also based on relevance 
concepts. The court observed: 
28 
Al though courts have emphasized the 
public policy considerations in applying the 
rule, these considerations are not its keystone. 
Rather, lack of probative value is the funda-
mental reason for excluding such evidence ... 
(citation omitted) .... A danger particularly 
relevant to the present case is that a jury, 
influenced by hindsight evidence, might apply 
an.artifically high standard in determining 
the adequacy of warnings .... Even contemporary 
corporate mass-producers are entitled to be 
judged by a fair standard. 
The evidence in this case presented the 
jury with a very close question regarding the 
adequacy of Ortho's warnings. Therefore, we 
cannot say the error in admitting this evidence 
was harmless. [Chapman, 388 N.E.2d at 561-562][28] 
The principal case that does not follow the rule excluding 
subsequent remedial measures in actions involving strict liability 
is Ault v. International Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 
197sr:- In that case the California Supreme Court held that 
culpability is not an issue in a strict liability case and, 
consequently, a rule which operates to exclude subsequent remedial 
measures does not apply. 
Ault asserted that the policy considerations behind the 
exclusionary rule are inapplicable because: 
The contemporary corporate mass producer of 
goods, the normal products liability defendant, 
manufactures ten of thousands of uni ts of 
goods; it is manifestly unrealistic to suggest 
that such a producer will forego making 
improvements in its product and risk enumerable 
additional lawsuits and the attendant adverse 
(Cont'd) 
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Absent compelling evidence establishing the lack of social 
utility in excluding subsequent remedial conduct in strict liability 
cases, this Court should not depart from its long standing policy 
of excluding such conduct to establish either causation or fault. 
c. None of the Judicially Created Exceptions to 
Evidence Rules Precluding the Admissibility of 
Subsequent Remedial Conduct Are Relevant Here. 
While counsel for the plaintiff clearly exploited the post-
1972 FDA mandated package inserts before the jury on the issue of 
causation, they have argued in pre-and post-trial proceedings 
that the evidence was relevant on the "feasibility" of preparing 
cautionary warnings. Obviously, there has never been an issue in 
this case as to the general feasibility, from a physical standpoint, 
of preparing and inserting printed warnings in drug packages. It 
is also obvious that later inserts do not establish the feasibility 
of imparting the information contained on them in earlier inserts 
28 {Cont'd) 
affect upon its public image, simply because 
evidence of adoption of such improvement may 
be admitted in an action founded on strict 
liability for recovery of an injury that 
preceded the improvement. [Ault, 528 P.2d at 
1152] --
Common sense dictates that this conclusion is wrong. Beyond the 
relevance questions raised by this Court in Bennett v. Pilot 
Products Co., 235 P.2d at 527, and by courts in other jurisdic-
tions in cases such as Chapman, absence of the exclusionary rule 
would discourage a free exchange of information between the FDA 
and the heal th care providers - pharmaceutical companies and 
physicians. See Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d at 859. See also 
Smith v. E.R. Squibb~ Sons, Inc., 273 N.W.2d at 481. Beside the 
Eighth Circuit, New York has followed the Ault rule. Caprara v. 
Chrysler f.2..EE., 417 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1981). --
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because that information may not have been known or knowable at 
h . 29 t e time. 
Courts which have dealt with this exclusionary rule inevitably 
have been faced with requests by parties to suspend its operation 
purportedly to establish feasibility of precautionary measures, 
ownership or control. In Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 
for example, the Indiana appellate court rejected the plaintiffs 
assertion that subsequent FDA mandated warnings were relevant on 
the issue of feasibility. In fact, the court found the argument 
to be transparent observing: 
29 
There is no need for the plaintiff to prove 
the defendant's practical ability to print 
warnings. The defendant never claimed it 
could not. If the evidence was offered to 
show an example of a reasonable mode of 
conveying a warning, it is irrelevant because 
there was as a matter of law no duty to 
directly warn the patient during the time in 
question. If the purpose of showing a caution 
which could have been made referred to the 
content, then it was clearly an attempt to 
prove that "because the world grows wiser as 
it gets older, therefore it was foolish 
before 11 •••• (citations omitted) .... This is 
exactly what the exclusionary rule proscribes. 
[Chapman, 388 N.E. 20 at 560][30] 
The trial testimony reveals that no evidence establishing an 
association, let alone a cause and effect relationship, between 
the use of progestational agents and limb reduction defects was 
in existence in July 1972 when Delalutin was administered to the 
plaintiff's mother (Tr.10). Dr. Nora one of the plaintiff's 
experts, testified that he first presented such associational 
evidence to the scientific community during the summer of 1973 
(P.Ex.764; Tr.1063). 
30 
The danger of permitting receipt of subsequent warnings 
on such insubstantial issues has been discussed by numerous 
commentators. Weinstein & Berger, Weinstein's Evidence-United 
States Rules, ~ 407 [01] for example observe: 
(Cont'd) 
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The assertion by counsel for the plaintiffs that these 
post-1972 warnings were introduced to show feasibility is pretextual 
and shou.ld be rejected by this Court. The same is true of the 
plaintiff's argument that these package inserts are relevant on 
the issues of knowledge and, thus, defect in 1972 when the drug 
was used. 
In sum, the package inserts and related documents are plainly 
hearsay which the trial court received for their "truth" over 
strenuous and repeated objection by Squibb, in contravention of 
U.R.E. 63. The evidence was consistently used to suggest that 
Delalutin was unsafe and that it caused plaintiff's injuries. In 
30 (Cont'd) 
[T]his exception is troublesome because the feasibility 
of a precaution may bear on whether it was negligent 
not to have taken the precaution; thus, negligence and 
feasibility are often not distant issues 
See also McCormick, Evidence § 275 at 668-669 (2d Ed. 1972) also 
warns courts to be wary of pretextual attempts to defeat the 
public policy expressed in rules such as U.R.E. 51. Professor 
McCormick observes: 
[T]he extrinsic policy of encouraging remedial 
safety measures is the predominant reason for 
holding evidence of these measures to be privileged. 
It is apparent that the free admission of such 
evidence for purposes other than as admissions of 
negligence is likely to defeat this paramount-
po~icy. It is submitted that before admitting the 
evidence for any of these other purposes, the 
court should be satisfied that the issue on which 
it is offered is of substantra1-rroportance-and is 
actually, and not merely formally in dispute, that 
the plaintiff cannot establish the fact to be 
inferred conveniently ~ other proof, and ££!!.:: 
sequently that the need for the ev~dence outweighs 
the danger of its misuse. [Emphasis added] 
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permitting this evidence to be introduced the court also disregarded 
the policy expressed in U.R.E. 51 which forbids the introduction 
of subsequent remedial conduct to establish the liability of the 
actor. These errors are so substantial that they require reversal 
of the judgment below and directions that another trial be conducted. 
D. Even Assuming This Incompetent Evidence to be 
Admissible, Rules of Relevancy and Judicial 
Discretion Mandate its Exclusion. 
U.R.E. 45 reflects a balancing process for determining the 
admissibility of evidence which, though perhaps marginally competent 
and relevant, has a substantial capacity to confuse the fact 
finder or create undue prejudice in excess of its legitimate 
probative value. Terry v. Zions Co-Op. Mercantile Inst., 605 
P.2d 314, 323-325 (Utah 1979); Watkins v. Utah Poultry~ Farmers 
Co-Op., 251 P.2d 663, 667 (Utah 1952). 31 This balancing approach 
has been specifically employed to exclude FDA mandated warnings 
in drug product liability cases tried in Federal courts. Lindsay 
v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 637 F.2d at 94; Skill v. Martinez, 
91 F.R.D. at 510. Cf. Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 66 
F.R.D. at 86. 
31 
Fed. R. Evid. 403, which is similar to U.R.E. 45, provides 
that "although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by conditions 
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless preparation of cumulative 
evidence." Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 403, courts have excluded 
evidence found to be marginally relevant when its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and 
confusion. See City of New York v. Pullman Inc., 662 F.2d a~ 
915; Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical~., 637 F.2d at 94; Skill 
v. Martinez, 91 F.R.D. 498, 510 (D.N.J. 1981); Apicella v. McNeil 
Laboratories, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78, 86 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). 
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Even assuming that these warnings are competent and have 
relevance, it is of a most attenuated sort. If these FDA warnings 
constituted competent and relevant evidence, which they do not, 
their proper contribution to the resolution of the issues in this 
case was small. Yet the opportunity for confusing the fact 
finder was great. This ground is sufficient in itself to cause a 
court to exclude the evidence. U.R.E. 45; Terry v. Zions Co-Op. 
Mercantile, Inst., 605 P.2d 314, 323-325 (Utah 1979). The trial 
court's failure to exclude these warnings based on the balancing 
test expressed in U.R.E. 45 was an abuse of discretion requiring 
a reversal. Terry, 605 P.2d at 325. 
The plaintiff has suggested that the subsequent FDA warnings 
were relevant on the issue of feasibility and to establish knowl-
edge. In Terry v. Zions Co-Op Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d at 
323-325, however, this court found that the probative value of 
the evidence, even when crucial, must be weighed against the 
disadvantageous effects of confusing issues before the jury or 
the creation of undue prejudice. See also, Watkins v. Utah 
Poultry~ Farmers co-Op, 251 P.2d 663, 667 (Utah 1952). 
The record taken as a whole demonstrates that even if an 
argument can be made for the admissibility of the FDA warnings, 
their use by plaintiff's counsel resulted in massive prejudice to 
Squibb. This is especially true where, as here, information 
about the regulatory objectives of the FDA were not placed before 
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the jury. Rather the jury was left with the impression that a 
Federal regulatory agency made an affirmative judgment that use 
of Delalutin by pregnant women led to an elevated incidence of 
birth defects. The FDA, it should be remembered, was focusing on 
its duty to bring any possible health risk to the attention of 
the public and specifically was not making detailed scientific 
judgments about cause and effect relationships concerning progestins 
in general and certainly not Delalutin in particular. Its perspec-
tive in mandating these warnings further militates against their 
receipt in evidence. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. 
Ind. Co., Inc., 505 F.Supp. at 1147-1150. 
Because of the serious prejudice which Squibb would suffer 
when these inserts would, in effect, be permitted to testify 
against it, and given the marginal relevance of the warnings on 
issues presented to the jury, the trial court had a duty to 
exclude them as evidence. The judge's failure to do so, despite 
repeated objections by Squibb, irreparably harmed the defendant 
and requires a reversal of the judgment. U.R.E. 45; Terry v. 
Zions co-Op Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d at 323-325; Watkins v. 
Utah Poultry & Farmers Co-Op, 251 P.2d 667. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS WERE SO VAGUE 
AND MISLEADING THAT THE JURY COULD HAVE JUDGED 
SQUIBB UNDER THE ERRONEOUS STANDARD OF ABSOLUTE 
LIABILITY. 
The case was submitted to the jury on three theories of 
liability: negligence, breach of warranty and strict liability. 
In strict liability or breach of warranty cases involving prescrip-
tion drugs, where improper manufacture is not alleged, defect can 
only relate to the adequacy of the warning. This in turn can 
only be based on the state of knowledge--actual or constructive--
available to the manufacturer at the time the drug was used. 
Restatement of Torts (2d), § 402A Comments h, j and k. In this 
case, the court refused to so instruct the jury. Rather, the 
court instructed the jury that liability could be imposed without 
any regard to the adequacy of the warning. This constitutes a 
substantial error. The error was compounded by submitting the 
case to the jury on three different theories of liability, though 
each was based upon the same question--the adequacy of the warnings. 
Since the elements required to prove the inadequacy of the warning 
under each of the theories are virtually identical, the charge 
was unnecessarily repetitious and confusing. 
The erroneous and misleading instructions, to which Squibb 
took exception, were prejudicial to the defendant since they had 
the capacity to affect the outcome of the trial. As such, Squibb 
is entitled to a new trial. See, ~., Watters v. Querry, 588 
-so-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
P.2d 702 (Utah 1978); State v. Ouzounian, 491 P.2d 1093, 1095, 
(Utah 1971); Taylor v. Johnson, 393 P.2d 382, 386, (Utah 1964); 
In re Richard's Estate, 297 P.2d 542, 545, (Utah 1956), cert. 
denied 352 U.S. 943 (1956). See also Skaggs v. Clairol Inc., 85 
Cal. Rptr. 584 (Cal. Ct. of App. 1970). 
A. In Cases Involving Prescription Drugs, Concepts 
of Negligence Rather Than Strict Liability 
Necessarily Apply In Assessing the Adequacy of 
the Warnings. 
While Utah has adopted Restatement of Torts (2d), § 402A, 
and Comments g and n, the Utah Supreme Court, has not yet spoken 
on Comments h, j, and k. Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Company, 628 
P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981); Ernest Yi· Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 
601 P.2d at 158 (Utah 1979). This is thus a case of first impres-
. 32 
Sl.On. 
Prescription drugs by definition are presumed to possess the 
possibility of producing serious, untoward effects. If this were 
not the case, these drugs would not have to be dispensed through 
an intermediary, the physician. The warnings are generally 
32 
The elements of breach of implied warranty and strict liability 
"are essentially the same." Ernest Yi. Hahn, Inc. v. Arno Steel 
Co., 601 P.2d at 159. As noted in Greeno v. Clark Equipment 
Company, 237 F.Supp. 427, 429 (N.D. Ind. 1965), strict liability 
under Section 402A: 
is hardly more than what exists under implied 
warranty when stripped of the contract doctrines 
of privity, disclaimer, requirements of 
notice of defect, and limitation through 
inconsistencies with express warranties. 
(Cont'd) 
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addressed to the physician who is also entrusted with the respon-
sibility of making judgments as to the propriety of prescribing a 
drug in a given situation. Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 
1264, 1276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Ortho 
Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d at 548-549. 
The development of pharmaceutical preparations frequently 
reflects new advances in medical science. Sometimes drugs are 
produced in response to the discovery of a new mechanism for 
causing disease, while in other cases, medical science is aware 
of the natural mechanism whereby the body accomplishes certain 
functions, but must await a technological advance in order to 
synthesize compounds to treat deficiencies. The process by which 
new drugs are discovered or developed, the process necessarily 
reflects the continuing evolution in medical/scientific knowledge. 
32 (Cont'd) 
As such, defendant's comments concerning the inadequacy of the 
strict liability instruction as pertains to strict liability 
apply with equal force to the instructions pertaining to breach 
of warranty. 
In this case, there was no allegation that Delalutin, · either 
in terms of formula or contents, was other than what Squibb 
intended it to be. In other words, there was no allegation that 
the drug was improperly "manufactured. 11 Thus, the only issue 
under breach of warranty, or more properly implied warranty since 
there were no express warranties, pertained to the adequacy of 
the warning. There is, therefore, no practical difference between 
the theories of breach of warranty and strict liability. The 
duty to warn in both cases is measured by the same standard. 
Smith v. E.R. Squibb~~' Inc., 273 N.W.2d at 480; Basko v. 
Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 427 (2d Cir. 1969); Ortho 
Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d at 551. 
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Knowledge concerning the hazards associated with any new 
drug is also evolutionary in nature. Sometimes an adverse reaction 
appears so infrequently that it cannot be detected even though 
the drug is tested on a substantial number of individuals. See, 
~-, Hearings on Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry, 
Subcomm. on Reorganization and Internal Organization, Senate 
Comm. on Government Operations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 11, 
at 4339 (1969). Other drug hazards have a latency period which 
can mask potential dangers. Hearings .2Q the Regulation of Diethyl-
stilbestrol, Subcomm. of House Comm. on Governmental Operations, 
92 Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 2 at 233 (1971). 
While animal studies are employed to overcome this lack of 
knowledge since animals have shorter reproductive cycles and life 
spans, the scientific community readily acknowledges that there 
are many gaps in the correlation between experience with test 
animals and humans. Consequently, until there is extensive and 
protracted human experience potential hazards may not be detectable. 
Finally, controlled clinical investigations cannot begin to 
simulate all of the circumstances under which a drug might be 
given. As testified to by physicians, "pre-marketing clinical 
trials can never subplant wide-spread clinical use as a means 
of assessing the ultimate hazards of a drug." Merrill, "Compensa-
tion For Prescription Drug Injuries," 59 Vir. ~· Rev. 1, 20 (1973). 
Section 402A evinces an awareness of the potentially stifling 
effect that the application of strict liability, divorced from 
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the reality of the continuing evolution of medical/scientific 
knowledge, could have on the development of new drugs. Comments h, 
j and k specifically reflect the concern over imposing strict or 
33 
absolute liability on the manufacturers of prescription drugs. 
Consequently, al though knowledge of dangerous conditions is 
generally imputed to manufacturers where the doctrine of strict 
liability applies, Comments h, j and k dictate that, in the 
context of prescription drugs, the duty to warn is to be measured 
33 
There is a definite interaction between Comments h, j, and 
k. Ortho Pharmaceutical £2.EE.· v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d at 546. 
Comment h in pertinent part provides: 
Where, however, he [the seller] has reason to 
anticipate that danger may result from a 
particular use, as where a drug is sold which 
is safe only in limited doses [or only if not 
used at certain times during pregnancy], he 
may be required to give adequate warning of 
the danger (see Comment j), and a product 
sold without such a warning is in a defective 
condition. 
Comment j states that a product may be unreasonably dangerous if 
the manufacturer fails to warn of an inherent danger. It provides 
in pertinent part: 
[T]he seller is required to warn [of a danger], 
if he has knowledge, or by the application of 
reasonable, developed human skill and foresight 
should have knowledge of the presence of ... the 
danger. 
Comment k, dealing with unavoidably unsafe products, speaks of 
the manufacturer's duty to warn of dangers in terms of "the 
present state of human knowledge," and is consistent with scope 
of the duty as defined in comment j. Although we believe that 
this case is more properly analyzed under Comment j, since Squibb 
believes that Delalutin is safe, a discussion of which of the 
comments apply in what factual situation is not germane to this 
argument given the posture of this case on appeal. 
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by the traditional negligence concept--reasonable care under the 
. 34 
circumstances. See, ~., Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly and Co., 420 
A.2d 1305, 1318 (N.J. Law Div. 1980), disapproved on other grounds, 
Namm v. Charles E. Frost~ co., 427 A.2d 1121 (N.J. App. Div. 
1981) . 
The rationale for applying a negligence standard in prescrip-
tion drug cases in assessing the scope of the manufacturer's duty 
is, perhaps, best expressed in Woodill v. Parke Davis~ Co., 402 
N.E. 2d 194 (Ill. 1980), where the court stated: 
34 
We believe our holding in this case is 
justified because a logical limit must be 
placed on the scope of a manufacturer's 
liability under a strict liability theory. 
To hold a manufacturer liable for failure to 
warn of a danger which it would be impossible 
to know based on the present state of human 
knowledge would make the manuacturer a virtual 
insurer of the product .... [Id at 199]_ 
*** 
We simply think in accordance with 
comments-· j and k of Section 402A of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, that where 
liability is framed by the manufacturer's 
duty to warn adequately of dangers which may 
arise from the use of a drug, that liability 
should be based £!! there being some manner in 
which to know of the danger. Otherwise, the 
warning itself, which is the focus of the 
liability, would be a meaningless exercise. 
[Id. at 200] 
As noted in Chambers v G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F.Supp. 377, 
381 (D .. Md. 1975), aff'd o.b:: 567 F.2d 269(4th Cir. 1977) cases 
dealing with other products such as machines, where "there may be 
a distinction drawn between a negligent failure to warn and the 
warning requirements for strict liability 11 , are not apposite in 
prescription drug cases. 
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Virtually every court which has considered Section 402(A), 
Conunents h, j and k, in the context of cases such as this has 
held that the duty to warn, regardless of plaintiff's theory of 
liability, is predicated on traditional concepts of negligence. 
The drug company's duty to warn relates only to those dangers 
about which it knew, or should have known, through the exercise 
of reasonable care. As stated by the Michigan Supreme Court in 
Smith v. E.R. Squibb~ Sons, Inc., 273 N.W.2d at 479-480: 
(W]hen liability turns on the adequacy 
of a warning, the issue is one of reasonable 
care, regardless of whether the theory pled 
is negligence, implied warranty or strict 
liability in tort. 
See Chambers v. G. D. Searle~ £2.., 441 F.Supp. at 380-81; Werner 
v. Upjohn Co., Inc., 628 F.2d at 858; Basko v. Sterling Drugs 
Inc., 416 F.2d at 426; Ortho Pharmaceutical f.2.!:E.. v. Chapman, 388 
N.E.2d at 548; Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 402 N.E.2d at 197-198; 
Dalke v. Upjohn, 555 F.2d 245, 248 {9th Cir. 1977). See generally 
Kidwell, "The Duty to Warn: A Description of the Model of Decision," 
53 Tex. L. Rev. 1375, 1377-78 (1975). 35 
35 
Our research has revealed only one prescription drug case 
where the court indicated a willingness to impute knowledge of 
possible adverse reactions to the manufacturer. Hamil ton v. 
Hardy, 549 P.2d 1099 (Colo. 1976). In that case, the evidence 
demonstrated that the manufacturer had received numerous reports 
of a particular adverse reaction over a period of several years 
prior to when the plaintiff sustained her injury. Although the 
court did not, therefore, have to address the issue of the scope 
of the manufacturer's duty to warn, it did hold that negligence 
and strict liability were not identical, even in a drug case. In 
so doing, the court ignored the provisions of comments h, j and k 
indicating that knowledge of the drug manufacturer is to be 
measured in terms of what the manufacturer knew or should have 
known at the time the injury was sustained. No other court has 
followed the decision in Hamilton. 
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In this case, Squibb, relying on Needham v. White Laboratories, 
Inc., 639 F.2d 394 (7th Cir.), cert. denied U.S. I 102 
S.Ct. 427 (1981), sought to defend under Comment j. Whether one 
applies Comment j or Comment k, however, makes no difference. 
Woodill v. Parke Davis~ Co., at 200; Needham, 639 F.2d at 402. 
The standard to be applied in determining the adequacy of the 
warning is a negligence standard. Indeed, many courts have found 
that the standard is identical to that articulated in the Restate-
ment of Torts (2d) § 388. 36 See ~, Torsiello v. Whitehall 
Laboratories, 398 A.2d 132 (N.J. App. Div. 1979; Sterling Drugs, 
Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978, 992 (8th Cir. 1969); Hoffman v. 
'Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132, 140 n.26 (3d Cir. 1973). 37 
The trial court apparently recognized the principles urged 
by Squibb (Tr.1195, 2593-2595), and supported by prevailing case 
36 
For a case exclusively applying Section 388 (which embodies 
traditional negligence concepts in determining a drug company's 
duty to warn), see McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation, 
528 P.2d 522 (Ore. 1974). In that decision, the court noted that 
nothing therein was inconsistent with its decision in Cochran v. 
Brooke, 409 P.2d 904 (Ore. 1966). In so doing, the court confirmed 
that Cochran, a case in which the court refused to impose strict 
or absolute liability upon a prescription drug manufacturer, was 
still good law. McEwen at 530, n. 12. Since McEwen was decided 
after Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Company, 525 P.2d 1033 (Ore. 
1974), a decision quoted from by plaintiff (Tr.1474), it is 
apparent that Oregon, like other jurisdictions, distinguishes 
between drug and non-drug cases, and applies in the former a 
negligence standard in determining the duty to warn under Section 
402A. 
37 
One court has even noted that if, in fact, there is any 
difference between strict liability and negligence as pertains to 
the adequacy of warnings, the concept of strict liability may 
under certain circumstances impose a more stringent burden. 
Ortho Pharmaceutical ££!1?.. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d at 551-552. 
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law, that where failure to warn is the issue, the manufacturer's 
duty under breach of warranty, strict liability and negligence is 
measured by the same standard--what the drug company knew or 
should have known exercising reasonable care ( R .1286, 1289; 
Court's Instruction Nos. 24 and 27). Having done so, the court 
then failed to properly instruct the jury on how the theories of 
breach of warranty and strict liability were to be applied where 
failure to warn was alleged. We urge that this Court now adopt 
Comments h, j and k as the law in Utah and hold that a prescrip-
tion drug manufacturer's duty to warn is circumscribed by what 
the manufacturer knew or should have known using reasonable care 
for the reasons set out below. We also urge that this court 
order a new trial since the jury Instructions did not properly 
limit the applicability of plaintiff's theories of liability 
based on the issues in the case. 
B. The Jury Instructions on Breach of Warranty 
and Strict Liability Were Erroneous and 
Permitted the Jury to Return a Verdict 
Premised on Absolute Liability. [38] 
The trial court discussed the basic elements involved in 
each of the theories upon which the case was being submitted to 
38 
Strict liability under Section 402A, when divorced from the 
defenses enumerated in Comments g, n, and p, is the equivalent of 
absolute liability. Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand, 628 P. 2d at 
1302-1303. It is clear that these comments have no bearing in a 
case such as this. Consequently, unless Comments h, j, and k are 
adopted, strict liability will become, in fact, absolute liability 
in most drug-related cases. 
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the jury in Instruction No. 1839 (R.1279-1280). Instruction 
Nos. 19-24 further defined the elements of negligence (R.1281-
1286). Instructions Nos. 25-27 (R.1287-1289) apparently were 
intended to define the elements under strict liability, since 
Instruction No. 25 is a classic charge in that regard. Whether 
or not Instructions 25-27 were also meant to apply to the basic 
charge on breach of warranty is unclear. The answer to this 
question, however,_ is of no consequence since an affirmative 
response would not remedy the deficiency in the instructions. 
Instruction No. 25 advised the jury that anyone who manufac-
tured or sold a "product in a defective condition unreasonably 
39 
INSTRUCTION NO. 18 
In order for plaintiff to recover against 
defendant E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., on the 
theory of breach of warranty (Second Count) 
she has the burden of proving by a preponder-
ance of the evidence each and all of the 
following facts: 
1. That said defendants represented or 
warranted to the plaintiff that said drug was 
reasonably fit for safe use by human beings. 
2. That plaintiff's mother relied upon 
the said representation or warranty. 
3. That said drug ~ not reasonably 
fit for safe use by human beings and was 
defective and dangerous. 
4. That £y reason of the defect i? the 
drug as aforesaid, the plaintiff sustained 
the damages and injuries of which she here 
complains. 
5. The amount of damages sustained by 
the plaintiff as a result of said breach of 
warranty. [R.1279; emphasis added] 
(Cont'd) 
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dangerous 11 was liable for any harm caused thereby even though 
11 [t]he . . . manufacturer has exercised all possible care .... " 
(R.1287). Squibb took exception to Instruction No. 25 "on the 
grounds that it is abstract in form and not applicable to the 
facts of the case ... 11 (Tr.2580). 
While Instruction No. 18, as it pertained to strict liability 
and breach of warranty, and Instruction No. 26, (R. 1288), 40 were 
similar to the instructions proposed by the defendant (R.870-871, 
881; Squibb's Proposed Instructions 3 and 10), the court refused 
39 (Cont'd) 
40 
In order for the plaintiff to recovery 
against the defendant E. R. Squibb & Sons, 
Inc., on her theory of strict liability 
(Third Count), she has the burden of proving 
each and all of the following facts by a 
preponderance of the evidence: 
1. That the drug Delalutin was manu-
factured or marketed by defendant E. R-:-
Squibb & Sons in ~ defective and unreasonably 
dangerous con di ti on for use in pregnant 
women. 
2. That no substantial change was made 
in the drug from the time it left the hands 
of the defendant E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. to 
the time it was administered to the plaintiff's 
mother. 
3. That as a result of such dangerous 
and defect~condition, plaintrff sustained 
the damages and injuries of which she her 
complains. [R.1280; emphasis added] 
Instruction No. 26 in essence advised the jury that a product 
was defective and unreasonably dangerous if it "had a propensity 
for causing physical harm beyond that which would be contemplated 
by the ordinary user .... " 
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to give Instruction lOA in the form proposed by Squibb. 41 Squibb 
took exception to this (Tr. 2581). The defendant's proposed 
instruction read as follows: 
PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. lOA 
You can find the Delalutin in question 
to have been in a defective condition unreason-
ably dangerous only if you determine that 
Squibb failed to warn of a known danger in 
the use of Delalutin, or a danger which 
should have been known given the state of 
technological development at the time the 
drug was administered to Kathleen Barson in 
1972. [R·~~; emphasis added.] 
The purpose of Instruction lOA was to put the concept of 
defect, which related both to breach of warranty and strict 
liability, in the context of the adequacy or inadequacy of the 
warning, which was the only basis upon which liability should be 
imposed. The failure of the Instructions to define the terms 
"defective and dangerous," "defect," and "defective and unreason-
able ·condition" solely in terms of the adequacy of the warning 
rendered the charge on breach of warranty and strict liability 
fatally defective. 
Once the court failed to limit the breach of warranty instruc-
tion to the adequacy of the warning based upon what Squibb knew 
or should have known, the jury was free to find that Delalutin 
41 
The record does not reflect the reasons why the court refused 
to instruct the jury that the defective condition pertained only 
to the adequacy of the warnings. Most of the conference between 
the court and counsel concerning the Instructions was held off 
the record (Tr.2132-2139). 
-61-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"was not reasonably fit and safe for use in human beings" since 
it produced teratogenic effects which rendered it "defective and 
dangerous [Instruction No. 18]." As instructed, the jury could 
have found Squibb liable under breach of warranty without ever 
determining if Squibb breached its duty to warn, based on its 
actual or constructive knowledge at the time. 
What was said about the Instruction on breach of warranty is 
equally true for the charge on strict liability. Certainly the 
Instructions on strict liability, as framed, had the potential to 
create in the minds of the jurors the notion that Squibb could be 
held absolu_tely responsible. If the jury found that, despite 
exercising "all possible care", Delalutin might be teratogenic 
and was, therefore, "in a defective and unreasonably dangerous 
condition for use in pregnant women [Instruction No. 18]", then 
it could find Squibb liable in conformity with Instructions Nos. 18, 
25, 26 and 27 without ever considering the adequacy of the warnings 
in the light of Squibb's actual knowledge or, indeed, its ability 
to know about a drug's potential danger. 
Any doubt that the court's Instructions conveyed the idea 
that Squibb could be held absolutely liable was resolved by the 
comments of plaintiff's counsel. Specifically, he advised the 
jury that "in this case we rely upon three theories" (Tr.2471) 
but "we" are "not required to prove each and every one of those 
theories of negligence, warranty, and strict liability; anyone 
[sic]" (Tr.2472). After suggesting that the theories were in 
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fact different, plaintiff's counsel demonstrated his belief that 
the Instructions on breach of warranty and/or strict liability 
were tantamount to imposing absolute liability when he later com-
mented to the jury that: 
"The court has told you in the instruc-
tions that you can find Squibb absolutely 
liable under certain circumstances .... " 
[Tr.2570]. 
Of course, counsel's suggestions were erroneous as a matter of 
law. 
This case is analogous to the case of Skaggs v. Clairol 
Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 584 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970). In that case, the 
trial court charged the jury on the theories of negligence, 
strict liability and breach of warranty. The California appellate 
court first noted that: 
The [trial] court gave no other instruc-
tions on strict liability and never explained 
to the jury that the only "defect" in defen-
dants product which found any support in the 
evidence was defendants alleged failure to 
adequately label its product in such a way as 
to warn users that it [could produce certain 
adverse reactions]. [ Id. at 588; emphasis 
added] ~ 
Having previously concluded that Comment j merely articulated 
well-settled principals of negligence, the appellate court then 
went on to find that: 
Since the [trial] court had fully in-
structed on negligence, with particular 
reference to negligent labeling, the instruc-
tions on "strict" liability were wholly 
unnecessary. They were also dangerously 
misleading, in that the court incorrectly 
advised the jury that strict liability 
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afforded a separate basis for liability, 
independent of the negligent labeling theory 
on which it had already instructed, and also 
incorrectly advised the jury that defendant 
could be held strictly liable for a defect in 
its product without proof that it was negligent. 
[Id. at 588] 
Based on this, the appellate court concluded that: 
Faced with the above instructions, the 
jury could believe that plaintiff's right to 
recover damages from defendant was dependent 
solely upon a showing that she purchased 
defendants product, used it and suffered an 
allergic reaction .... [Id. at 588] 
Finding that the defendant's liability was not "so clearly estab-
lished as to render it improbable that the jury would have re-
turned a different verdict had it been properly instructed", the 
42 California appellate court reversed. 
Other courts have also recognized that in cases where "defect" 
is defined in terms of adequacy of the warning, charging the jury 
on strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty has the 
potential to confuse and mislead the jury. Smith v. E.R. Squibb 
~Sons, Inc., 273 N.W.2d at 480; Ortho Pharmaceutical f.2.!:E· v. 
Chapman, 388 N.E.2d at 552. See Rainbow v. Albert Elia Building 
Co., Inc., 373 N.Y.S. 2d 928 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975). 
In this case, the trial court not only instructed the jury 
on three different theories, which in and of itself might have 
suggested that the theories differed, but also failed to advise 
42 
The fact that Squibb's liability was not so clearly estab-
lished is attested to by the trial judge's statemtent that: 
"After one month of trial this court does not know whether Dela-
lutin is teratogenic during the first trimester of pregnancy." 
(R.1440). 
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the jury that 11 defect 11 or "defective condition" only dealt with 
the adequacy of the warning. It cannot be denied that the Instruc-
tions, regardless of which theory the jury might have returned 
its verdict, had a significant potential to confuse and mislead. 43 
Because one "cannot conclude with any degree of assurance" that 
if properly instructed the result might not have been more favor-
able to the appellant, Squibb is entitled to a new trial. Watters 
v. Querry, 588 P.2d 704 (Utah 1978). 
43 
As noted previously, counsel for the plaintiff advised the 
jury that, pursuant to the instructions, the jury could ttfind 
Squibb absolutely liable under certain circumstances .... " 
(Tr.2570.) Not only is this statement erroneous and misleading 
standing alone, but when considered in conjunction with counsel's 
statements a few moments earlier that Squibb had a "positive 
obligation ... to come in here with positive proof ... to support 
their drug," the prejudicial potential of the jury Instructions 
is overwhelming (Tr.2570). 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING TO THE 
JURY THE ISSUE OF NEGLIGENCE RELATED TO THE 
ALLEGED FAILURE TO TEST SINCE THERE WAS 
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO 
SUPPORT IT. 
The defendant requested a directed verdict on the first 
count of the complaint (negligence) as it related to negligent 
testing. Squibb argued that no evidence was produced to show 
that had animal teratology testing been done it probably would 
have provided information concerning the defects complained of by 
the plaintiff (Tr.2440, 2442, 2596). The application was denied 
by the court without explanation. Squibb took exception to the 
jury instructions on negligence for the same reason (Tr.2578-2579). 
The trial court's rationale for denying the motion was not clari-
fied when Squibb again raised the issue on its motion for judgment 
nothwithstanding the verdict or a new trial (Tr.2595-2596, 2631). 
For the reasons set forth below, the failure to grant defendant's 
motion in this regard not only constituted reversible error, but 
further aggravated the errors discussed in Point II. 
The jury was instructed that Squibb could be found liable if 
it "was negligent in the manufacturing, or testing, or marketing 
of the drug Delalutin. 11 (Instruction No. 18; R.1279. )44 The 
alleged negligence necessarily related to the failure to warn, 
although this is not entirely clear from a reading of the Instruc-
tions. In that regard, negligence could only have been predicated 
44 Since there was no allegation that the drug was impure, or 
otherwise adulterated, negligent manufacture was not an issue. 
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either on a failure to warn about known dangers, or the failure 
to warn of dangers about which Squibb would, and therefore should, 
have known had it "used state of the art" testing techniques. If 
the tests which Squibb negligently failed to perform would not 
have revealed that Delalutin caused limb anomalies, then the 
failure to test could not have been the proximate cause of Elizabeth 
Barson's injuries. In this case, testimony sufficient to estab-
lish this necessary link in the proximate cause chain is missing. 
"There is authority that inherent in the duty to test is the 
requirement that the defect would be revealed by testing." 1 
Frumer ~Friedman, Products Liability§ 6.01(1]. This principle 
was accepted by the Utah Supreme Court in Northern v. General 
Motors £2!:E.., 268 P.2d 981 (Utah 1954). See Sheward v. Virtue, 
126 P.2d 345, 347 (Cal. 1942). 45 In Livesley v. Continental 
Motors Corp., 49 N.W.2d 365 (Mich. 1951), cited by the Utah 
Supreme Court in the Northern case, the Michigan Supreme Court 
held that, where the expert testimony indicated the defect was 
"difficult 11 to pick up, there was still a "doubt" that the defect 
would have been discovered even if the standard test had been 
45 
In making this argument, which necessarily presumes existence 
of a defect, Squibb is in no way conceding that fact. As is 
apparent from a reading of the trial transcript, none of the 
studies relied upon by plaintiff's experts involved Delalutin and 
no one has ever claimed in the published literature that biological 
cause-and-effect between progestational agents in general, and 
Delalutin in particular, and limb anomalies has been proven. 
These claims are only made by courtroom experts who rely on older 
studies which have not been confirmed by any of the newer studies. 
Squibb continues to maintain that Delalutin is not defective. 
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performed. Since the evidence did not demonstrate that "the 
test ... would have disclosed on reasonably exercised diligence 
the presence of the [defect]," the judgment predicated on negligent 
testing was reversed. 49 N.W.2d at 369; emphasis added. 46 
Requiring proof that the omitted testing would probably have 
demonstrated the defect is only logical. To hold a manufacturer 
liable for not performing all possible tests, while failing to 
show that the non-performed test would probably have revealed the 
defect, is to predicate liability on acts without consequence. 
Culpable negligence would then be measured in the abstract. 
This, in essence, is what the trial court sanctioned when it 
refused to grant a directed verdict on negligent testing. 
The plaintiff offered considerable testimony concerning FDA 
guidelines for animal teratology testing(~., Tr.560, 620, 638, 
737, 739). 47 The testimony reveals that prior to the 1966 
46 See Buria v. Rosedale Engineering £2.!:E.., 184 N.Y.S.2d 395, 
397 (N.Y. App. Div. 1959) New York Appellate Division held that, 
despite plaintiff's proofs as to the proper test to determine 
whether the machine in question was in good working order, 
negligence [was] still not established unless 
it be shown that proper testing would have 
disclosed the . . . (product] to have been 
defective. There was no proof or offer of 
proof to establish that essential fact. 
Liability does not attach merely because a 
proper inspection could have shown the ... 
product to have been defective. The proof 
must be that the inspection would have shown 
that to be the case. [Emphasis in the original] 
47 The FDA guidelines for teratology tests on animals were 
introduced in evidence (Tr.559, 2015; P.Ex. 62). Despite all the 
evidence in this regard, no testimony was offered by the plaintiff 
to the effect that there is a probability that such tests would 
have revealed to Squibb that Delalutin might cause limb anomalies. 
(Cont'd) 
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implementation of the FDA guidelines on animal teratology testing, 
Squibb had ten years experience with the drug in humans. That 
experience did not in any way suggest that the drug could cause 
limb anamolies (Tr. 2043-2044). Further, animal testing in the 
nature of teratologic evaluation (i.e. administration to a pregnant 
dam with study of the pregnant offspring) was performed by Squibb 
in the early 1960's with no adverse effects observed (Tr.1931-1938). 
In light of that experience, when Squibb inquired of the FDA in 
1966 as to whether animal teratology testing should be done with 
Delalutin, the FDA indicated that it was not necessary (Tr.559-561, 
564, 1677-1680, 1695-1696, 1953): 
With Delalutin, I went down to the Food 
and Drug when they requested from--the Food 
and Drug came out to ask us to review all of 
our compounds and Delalutin was one of them 
on the list and I went down to see Dr. Lehman, 
Arnold Lehman, who was the head of the Pharma-
cology Division of the FDA, and he informed 
us--and I think he had with him at the same 
time the endocrinologist that worked with 
him, Dr. Custis [sic]--the two of them felt 
that the human is the best species for tera-
tological tests and they said since you have 
so many cases in the human, you do not need 
teratological tests in animals. [Tr.1677-1678] 
47 (Cont'd) 
Plaintiff also introduced considerable other testimony in an 
attempt to demonstrate that Squibb was negligent in testing 
Delalutin. This included the introduction of in-house documents 
which were written prior to the FDA approval of the drug for 
marketing (Tr.1502; P.Ex. 229, 230, 231, 232)). In light of the 
fact that the testing under discussion was all performed prior to 
FDA approval of the Delalutin NDA, these documents were wholly 
irrelevant. 
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All three of plaintiff's medical experts adopted the position 
of the FDA in minimizing the importance of animal testing as an 
accurate barometer of a drug's teratogenic potential where one 
already has extensive experience in'humans. Dr. Done, for example, 
observed that: 
A drug may be teratogenic in animals but 
not necessarily in humans or it may be tera-
togenic in humans and not in animals. It may 
also be different from one experimental 
animal to another ... so one doesn't really 
know in the last analysis what the real 
answer is in terms of people except £y people's 
experience. 
Surveillance of what happens in people 
who receive a drug is a crucial part for any 
effect, but particularly for one like tera-· 
togenicity where we don't really even have 
animal models that necessarily correlate with 
what happens in people. So observations of 
what is happening in people who receive the 
drug ... and to their offspring is crucial in 
getting what, in the last analysis, will be 
the only meaningful answer in whether the 
drug causes defects in people or not. [Tr.697-
698; emphasis added] 
Dr. Done further testified that animal studies had not shown 
Delalutin to be masculinizing (Tr.769,771), 48 and that, indeed, 
48 
Squibb had a continuing objection to testimony on "masculini-
zation" (used interchangeably at trial with "androgenic" and 
"virilization") (Tr. 612-613) . Yet despite the fact that the 
issue of masculinization was totally irrelevant, particularly 
since Elizabeth Barson sustained no such injury, the issue played 
a prominent role in the trial {Tr.294, 612, 613, 624-625, 627, 
634, 636, 769, 771, 773, 1218, 1318, 1863, 1929-1930, 1938, 2010, 
2038; and see Ex. 72, 73, 74, 415, 417, 520, 535, 779, and 781). 
Throughout, Squibb took the position that Delalutin is not mascu-
linizing although other progestational agents might be {Tr.1863, 
1929-30, 1938, 2010, 2038). There was no testimony that drugs 
(Cont'd) 
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there was a study using rhesus monkeys which showed Delalutin to 
be not only safe but effective (Tr.855-856). 
Dr. Nora testified that he had foregone a study in animals 
because human studies were more important since "you can't always 
be sure that what happened in non-humans will happen in humans" 
(Tr.1066). Finally, the comments of Dr. Goldman, another expert 
called by the plaintiff on rebuttal, are instructive: 
48 
To me the ideal animal model was one 
which duplicates the intended human use 
exactly, and from that point of view we don't 
have any. In other words, none of the studies 
were done in the exact way that they were 
intended for human use. However--and it is 
true that with the exception of the one 
observation of [Dr.] Lerner concerning Dela-
lutin there are no other published reports 
so--but that doesn't say that there doesn't 
exist an animal model, it simply says no one 
has published any observations on it at all. 
So in other words, if one did the proper 
study with Delalutin one may find an animal 
model or ™ may not. That's unclear. 
[Tr.2376; emphasis added] 
which masculinize also, or necessarily, cause limb malformations; 
in fact, the testimony was that masculinizing drugs do not cause 
malformations (Tr. 1936-1937, 2197). 
The plaintiff apparently sought to introduce such evidence 
on the theory that since Squibb acknowledged that some progesta-
tional agents might be masculinizing it should have been put on 
notice to do teratology animal testing (Tr.1494). Since there is 
no evidence that animal testing would have revealed anything, 
ipso facto, the evidence on masculinization introduced to show 
that Squibb should have been put on notice to do testing is 
entirely irrelevant. Such evidence should have been excluded 
pursuant to U.R.E. 4. If not totally irrelevant, the potential 
prejudice so outweighed the probitive value, that the evidence 
should have been excluded pursuant to U.R.E. 45. 
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None of the plaintiff's experts testified that there is a 
reasonable probability that were Squibb to have done animal 
teratology testing it would have learned anything to suggest that 
Delalutin caused limb anomalies. Based on all the evidence, it 
would be mere speculation to assume that Squibb would have learned 
anything to suggest that Delalutin caused limb anomalies had it 
performed teratological studies on animals. Indeed, a fair 
reading of all of the testimony suggests just the opposite. As a 
matter of law then, the plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie 
case based on a theory of negligent testing. Chambers v. G.D. 
Searle ~ Co., 441 F.Supp. at 385; Northern v. General Motors 
~., 268 P.2d at 291; Livesley v. Continental Motors~., 49 
N.W.2d at 365; Sheward v. Virtue, 126 P.2d at 345. The trial 
court, having denied defendant's application for a directed 
verdict on the theory of negligent testing, and having instructed 
the jury on this theory, committed reversible error. Morrison v. 
Perry, 140 P.2d 772 (Utah 1943). See Taylor v. Johnson, 393 P.2d 
3 8 2 . bb . h f . 1 . 49 . Squi is, t ere ore, entit ed to a new trial. 
49 
As noted at the beginning of Point III, the failure of the 
court to grant a directed verdict on the issue of negligent 
testing lends support to the argument made in Point II. Instruc-
ting the jurors on an issue for which there was no factual support 
could only further mislead and confuse the jury to the prejudice 
of the defendant. Thus, even if each of the errors 
may not by themselves j us ti fy a reversal, 
[they] may well, when considered together 
with others, render it clear that a fair 
trial was not had. In such an event justice 
can only be served by granting a new trial. 
[Ivie v. Richardson, 336 P.2d 781, 787 (Utah 
1959)]. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED HARMFUL ERROR IN 
ADMITTING EVIDENCE RELATING TO: (1) THE EFFICACY 
OF DELALUTIN AND (2) PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 58 
CONTAINING REFERENCES TO DRUG EXPERIENCE REPORTS. 
Plaintiff's counsel was permitted over objections to introduce 
entirely irrelevant evidenqe concerning the efficacy of Delalutin. 
Needham v. White Laboratories, 639 F. 2d 394. Additionally, 
plaintiff was permitted to improperly summarize Drug Experience 
Reports ("DER's") that had been excluded. See, ~., Intermountain 
Farmers Ass'n v. Fitzgerald, 574 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1978), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1979) The admission of this evidence, 
either independently or in conjunction with other erroneously 
admitted evidence, requires that a new trial be granted since 
this evidence "probably had a substantial influence in bringing 
about the verdict .... " U.R.E. 4. 
A. The Evidence as to Efficacy was Irrelevant 
arid Prejudicial. 
Squibb's motion in limine urged the exclusion of evidence 
pertaining to the efficacy of Delalutin (R. 591-593; PR.62-64). 
The plaintiff argued that the evidence was relevant on two issues: 
the inadequacy of testing (PR.64) and punitive damages (PR.70). 
Plaintiff also argued that the issue of efficacy was so intertwined 
with the issue of safety that it was impossible to put in evidence 
on the latter point without discussing the former (PR. 67-68). 
The trial court initally deferred any ruling on this question 
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(PR.73), indicating that it would wait until the time of trial to 
make such rulings (PR.74). 
Immediately prior to the commencement of trial, Squibb again 
moved to exclude evidence on efficacy (Tr. 263-280). The plaintiff 
advanced the same arguments for admissibility (Tr.263, 267, 
269). SO At the conclusion of the argument, the court again 
declined to rule; the trial judge did, however, caution plaintiff's 
counsel that they would run the risk of causing prejudice by 
discussing the subject of efficacy in their opening remarks to 
50 
In response to the plaintiff's pre-trial assertion prior to 
trial that the proper testing of Delalutin was an issue, the 
following colloquy took place: 
THE COURT: [Tested] [p]roperly for what purpose? 
MR. HUNTLEY [Counsel for Plaintiff]: For use 
on pregnant women. 
THE COURT: Well, isn't it properly for the 
use of safety rather than properly for what 
it's suppose to do? [Tr. 269] 
After more discussion, the Court again evidenced its concern as 
to why the material on efficacy was relevant: 
THE COURT: If what you are saying is correct, 
and it will be a controverted issue of fact 
as to efficacy. My problem in the whole thing 
is what difference does it make? You're [refer-
ring to Squibb] saying it makes no difference 
because that isn't anything they are to decide 
here, whether it suited its purpose or not. 
You're [i.e. referring to plaintiff] saying 
that it is so interwoven in their motives in 
testing that you can't separate it. 
MR. RACINE [counsel for plaintiff]: That's 
precisely right. I don't know how we can. 
[Tr.272] 
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the jury (Tr.276-280). Subsequently, in his opening statement, 
plaintiff's counsel made reference to efficacy testing to which 
there was an objection. The objection was overruled (Tr.291). 
Over objection, plaintiff was permitted to question Dr. Done 
about whether Delalutin had ever been proven efficacious in 
maintaining pregnancy (Tr.759-760). Dr. Done testified that in 
his opinion it had not (Tr.761, 811). 51 The subject of efficacy 
again came up during Squibb's cross-examination of Dr. Nora when, 
in a series of non-responsive answers, he volunteered that neither 
he nor the FDA thought that hormones sustained pregnancy, and 
that the FDA 11 came out with reports that said these things don't 
have anything to do with maintaining pregnancy [Tr .1053-1054]. 11 
The trial judge allowed those answers despite Squibb's motion to 
strike on the ground that efficacy was not an issue (Tr.1054). 
The plaintiff continued to raise on cross-examination of Squibb's 
witnesses the subject of studies indicating that Delalutin had 
not been proven effective (Tr.1646, 1847, 1854, 1991). During 
the examination of plaintiff's rebuttal witness, Dr. Goldman, the 
issue was again raised (Tr.2390). 
51 
Assuming, that the efficacy of a drug is relevant on the 
issue of liability, the test is "apparent" efficacy at the time 
of manufacturer and not efficacy in fact. Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly 
and Co., 420 A.2d at 1319. Thus, besides the testimony on efficacy 
being-irrelevant, the testimony of plaintiff's experts, which 
went to the question of efficacy in fact, was certainly inadmissible. 
Assuming efficacy to be relevant, the only issue was wh.ether 
Squibb could reasonably believe, as found by the NAS-NRC in 1971, 
that Delalutin was "probably effective." See this Brief, supra 
at 8. 
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Plaintiff's argument that efficacy was relevant to the issue 
of punitive damages was rendered moot when the court granted a 
directed verdict on that issue at the end of plaintiff's case 
(Tr.1497). Since efficacy testing was irrelevant on the issue of 
whether animal teratology testing would have revealed any informa-
tion concerning limb anomalies, such evidence was also irrelevant 
. f 1 . 52 c tl th 1 b . on the issue o neg 1gence. onsequen y, e on Y as1s 
remaining in the record for the trial court to admit evidence on 
efficacy, or on testing directed to establishing it, was that 
such evidence was inseparable from evidence concerning safety or 
. . . 53 teratogen1c1ty. 
A review of the record indicates that there were only two 
classes of documents which mention both efficacy and safety. One 
class is the FDA mandated package inserts which we have previously 
discussed; the other class consisted of references to a single 
report of a test on rhesus monkeys (Tr.2604). Consquently, 
52 
Squibb repeatedly stressed the fact that efficacy studies 
and teratology studies were designed to demonstrate entirely 
different things and that efficacy studies proved nothing as to 
safety (PR.71-72; Tr.266). 
53 
In fact, this remained the plaintiff's only post-trial 
justification: 
Additionally, counsel [for Squibb] is in 
error in suggesting that the "lack of efficacy 11 
evidence was put in before the jury on the 
issue of the drug being defective.--Rather, 
it was part of the overall history of the 
marketing of the drug showing lack of proper 
testing by Squibb, and the evidence on efficacv 
merely came in because it ~ interwoven in 
the documentary and other evidence concerning 
the history of the marketing of the drug. 
(R. at p. 14, emphasis added] 
- -76-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
evidence on efficacy could easily have been segregated from 
evidence relating to safety. The evidence on efficacy was gra-
tuitous; it was, however, significant and prejudicial because, 
despite protestations of plaintiff's counsel to the contrary, the 
jury could easily have gotten the impression that efficacy, or 
lack thereof, was relevant on the issue of defect. As such, 
defendant is entitled to a new trial. Needham v. White Laboratories, 
639 F.2d 394. 
In Needham, the daughter of a woman who took Dienestrol 
brought an action against White Laboratories alleging the drug 
caused her cancer. During the course of the trial, the district 
court permitted in evidence testimony pertaining to efficacy. 
The defendant, White Laboratories, appealed from that ruling. 
The Seventh Circuit held that the admission of evidence con-
cerning the effectiveness of the drug Dienestrol for treatment of 
threatened and habitual miscarriages constituted reversible error 
where the defendant drug company did not defend on the ground 
that the drug was "unavoidably unsafe 11 as that term is used in 
the the Restatement of Torts (2d) § 402A, Comment k. The court 
noted that 
[a] comment k defense is available only where 
the manufacturer warned of the danger, yet 
the product remains dangerous even if the 
warning is followed. [Needham, 639 F.2d at 402] 
During the trial White asserted that it did not know and 
reasonably could not have known of the dangerous propensity of 
Dienestrol. For that reason no warning accompanied the drug. 
"Thus, conunent k, by its terms, could not provide a defense .... " 
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Id. at 402. White's defense is analogous to that proffered here, 
with Squibb 'continuing to maintain that Delalutin does not cause 
limb anomalies. Thus, as in Needham, Comment k was not available 
as a defense. Rather, Squibb properly sought to defend on the 
basis of Comment j. Evidence of efficacy or inefficacy was 
irrelevant. In Needham, the Seventh Circuit observed in revers-
ing: 
White never attempted to assert an 
affirmative defense based on comment k. 
Rather, White correctly argued that comment j 
governed this cause of action for the disposi-
ti ve issue in this case is whether White 
should be held liable for its failure to warn 
of the risk of cancer to the offspring of 
pregnant women who use Dienestrol. If White 
knew, or by the application of reasonable 
human skill and foresight should have known 
of the risk of cancer, White is liable to 
Needham for its failure to warn. Woodill v. 
Parke Davis & Co., 79 Ill. 2d 26, 37 Ill. 
Dec. 304, 402 N:'"E.2d 194 (1980). Because 
White failed to warn, comment k could not 
apply in this case and evidence of the efficacy 
or inefficacy of Dienestrol was irrelevant. 
[Needham v. White Laboratories, 639 F.2d at 
402] 
The holding of Needham is applicable here. Squibb never 
asserted the Comment k defense for unavoidably unsafe products. 
Its position is that Delalutin does not cause birth defects. 
Accordingly, Comment j governs and evidence of whether Delalutin 
was effective or ineffective in preventing miscarriages is ir-
relevant. Since the concept of defect was never defined, and the 
jury was never given a limiting instruction as to how, if at all, 
efficacy could be considered, one cannot dismiss the possibility 
that the jury maintained the misconception that the lack of 
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efficacy, per se, constituted a defect. Certainly, neither the 
parties nor the court know how the jury evaluated this evidence. 
As such, Squibb is entitled to a new trial. Needham, 639 F.2d at 
402-403, and see Watters v. Querry, 588 P.2d 702. 54 
B. Testimony and a Summary Containing Information 
From FDA Drug Evaluation Reports Were Impro-
perly Received In Evidence by the Trial Court. 
During the course of the redirect testimony of the plaintiff's 
expert Dr. Done, counsel sought for the first time to introduce 
in evidence the DER's on Delalutin submitted to the FDA pursuant 
to 21 u. s. c. § 355 ( j) (Tr. 935). The Federal Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act requires that drug companies routinely forward these 
FDA any reports they receive regarding experiences with a particu-
lar drug regardless of the source of that information. 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(j); 21 C.F.R. §310.300. 
The trial court sustained Squibb's objection to the computer 
printout summarizing the DER's respecting Delalutin from 1969-1979, 
but inexplicably permitted Dr. Done to relate this information to 
the jury in testimony and by reference to a summary exhibit 
54 
Even if marginally relevant, evidence as to efficacy should 
have been excluded since the probative value was "substantially 
outweighed by the risk that it admission . . . [would] create 
substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the .issues 
or of misleading the jury. 11 U. R. E. 45. See Terry v. Zions 
Co-Op. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2 at 323-325, Watkins v. Utah 
Poultry & Farmers CO::Op, 251 P.2d at 667, SheEard v. United 
States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933), Hoffman v. Sterling Drugs, Inc., 
374 F.Supp. 850, 862-863 (M.D. Pa. 1974). 
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(Tr. 935-940). This testimony and reference to the DER' s on 
Delalutin (Tr.941-942) was extremely prejudicial to Squibb because 
virtually no other mention of Delalutin being associated with -
.limb anomalies was contained on P.Ex. 58. Since the court per-
mitted the prejudicial introduction of this compound hearsay, 
over appropriate objection, Squibb is entitled to a retrial. 
U.R.E. 4, 63 (15), and 70. 
In an effort to introduce this multiple hearsay evidence, 
plaintiff's counsel elicited testimony from Dr. Done that the FDA 
computer printout summarizing DER's relating to Delalutin was 
itself an official government record kept in the ordinary course 
of the FDA's business (Tr.939; Proposed P.Ex. 79). Of course, 
Dr. Done, who had obtained these reports under the Freedom of 
Information Act (Tr.935) provided no information as to how the 
FDA's computer printout was prepared, nor is it likely from the 
examination of foundational testimony adduced that he had any 
idea. Dr. Done, while opining that this computer printout was, 
in fact, made in course of the regular course of the FDA' s business, 
provided the trial court with no foundational information upon 
which it could make such a finding (Tr.936). Dr. Done, however, 
candidly advised the court that this computer printout, apparently 
published by the FDA, was one of the sources of information which 
was contained on P.Ex.58, a summary chart introduced in evidence 
in connection with his testimony (Tr. 935; Proposed P. Ex. 79; 
P. Ex. 58) . 
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The summary exhibit itself had been the subject of strenuous 
and repeated objections by the attorneys for Squibb (Tr.714-722). 
Buried within that exhibit was the following reference: "Done, 
FDA Reports 1969-79" (P.Ex. 58). The initial objections to the 
admissibility of P.Ex. 58 were made by Squibb because it purported 
to extract and extrapolate factual information from medical 
literature. In essence, Squibb argued that this was an indirect 
way of introducing into evidence "learned treatises" which could 
otherwise not be introduced (Tr.724-725). Jenkins v. Parrish, 
627 P.2d 533 (Utah 1981). 55 The trial judge, however, overruled 
55 
In addition to containing reference to the DER's, P.Ex. 58 
also contained numerous references to studies involving oral 
contraceptives and hormonal pregnancy tests. Squibb repeatedly 
objected to the introduction of testimony concerning other drugs 
on the basis of the fact that, while there was some similarity, 
there were also substantial differences between Delalutin and 
these drugs. For example, hormonal pregnancy tests and oral 
contraceptives also contain estrogen. Dr. Done acknowledged that 
the inclusion of such drugs in any study on the effect of pro-
gestegins could introduce a confounding or confusing factor 
(Tr.823, 875, 890, and 892). The introduction of testimony, 
including Exhibit 58, containing references to other drugs, con-
taining compounds not in Delalutin, had the capacity to confuse 
the issues and mislead the jury. While defendant believes that 
such evidence was irrelevant, even if marginally relevant, the 
probative value was far outweighed by the risk of prejudice to 
the defendant. U.R.E. 45. See Terry v. Zions Co-Op Mercantile 
Inst., 605 P.2d at 323-325, Watkins v. Utah Poultry and Farmers 
co-op, 251 P.2 at 667, Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. at 104. 
Thus, in Hoffman v. sterling Drugs, Inc., 374 F.Supp. at 862-863, 
the district court excluded evidence concerning the known side 
effects of other drugs which were chemically "quite similar" to 
the drug in issue (Aralen). The court characterized the evidence 
as being "of dubious value," and rejected it on the ground that 
its admission had the capacity, among other things to "mislead 
{Cont'd) 
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Squibb's objection (Tr.722-723). At no time during the course of 
this argument did the plaintiff identify the source of these so 
called "FDA Reports" to the court nor were they presented to the 
jury before redirect examination. 
It is clear that in U.R.E. 70 does not permit the introduc-
tion of summarized information simply because the underlying 
information itself is voluminous. See Gull Laboratories, Inc. v. 
Louis~· Roser Co., 589 P.2d 756 (Utah 1979). U.R.E. 70(l)(g) is 
a best evidence rule permitting summaries in lieu of the original 
materials only when they are so voluminous that their handling in 
1 1 . d 1 d . . 56 court wou d resu t in e ay an inconvenience. U.R.E. 70, 
however, does not excuse a party from laying a proper foundation 
for the admission of the underlying documents in evidence. This 
point was forcibly made by this Court in Intermountain Farmers 
Ass'n. v. Fitzgerald, 574 P.2d 1162. The Utah Supreme Court 
found that error was committed when the trial court allowed 
defendant to read in material contained in exhibits that had 
55 (Cont'd) 
the factfinder. 11 Hoffman, 374 F. Supp. at 862-863. Evidence 
concerning other drugs such as oral contraceptives and hormonal 
pregnancy tests, which contain estrogen and were therefore dif-
ferent than Delalutin, should not have been ad.mi tted. Their 
inclusion in Exhibit 58 confirms the error and highlights the 
prejudice to the defendant in admitting that exhibit. 
56 
U.R.E. 70(l)(g) provides that the voluminous writings must 
be present in court for use in cross-examination. Otherwise 
either the adverse party must waive their production or the court 
must find their production is unnecessary. 
-82-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
been previously denied admission. Id., 574 P.2d at 1164. This 
Court went on to observe that: 
Rule 70 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
prohibits proof of contents of a writing, 
other than by the writing itself, with few 
exceptions. None of said exceptions were 
noted here. 
The record reveals that general revenue 
records, magazine articles, and other such 
evidence were not allowed in, but were used 
as the basis of testimony .... 
. . . . The conduct of the defendant, 
reading the exhibits that had been excluded 
or refused, circumvented the very rule of law 
provided in Rule 70 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. For though the exhibits were 
refused, the unsubstantiated information 
contained in those exhibits were nevertheless 
presented directly to the jury for its full 
consideration by the defendant's verbatim 
reading of the exhibits. [ Intermountain 
Farmers Ass'n. v. Fitzgerald, 574 P.2d 
1166-1166] 
See International Harvester Credit £2.!:E.. v. Pioneer Tractor and 
Implement, Inc., 626 P.2d 418 (Utah 1981); Shurtleff v. Jay Tuft 
~ Co., 622 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1980); Gull Laboratories, Inc. v. 
Louis A. Roser Co., 589 P.2d 756. 
The underlying documentation, the DER's, which were summarized 
by Dr. Done, were found to be inadmissible by the trial court 
(Tr. 940). The trial judge was clearly correct in sustaining 
Squibb's objection since no foundation was laid to establish that 
the DER's were made and kept in the ordinary course of the FDA's 
business, nor was any foundation developed to show that they were 
"official records. 1157 
57 U.R.E. 63(13) permits the receipt of business records. 
While this Court has found that records kept by government agencies 
themselves can by admitted under the business records' exception, 
(Cont'd) 
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The decisions by the Utah Supreme Court requiring that 
summarized records themselves be admissible in evidence is a 
reflection of this Court's concern that reliable and trustworthy 
information is placed before the factfinder. See, ~. Interna-
tional Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor and Implement, 
Inc., 626 P.2d 418 (Utah 1981). They are also consistent with 
the rulings of virtually every other Federal and state court 
which has considered the admission of such compilations. As we 
have noted, DER's are sporadic, voluntary and at best anecdotal 
reports of inj-q.ries and their association with a drug. When 
received for their truth they are testimonial in character and 
therefore hearsay. Squibb, since it does not initiate these 
reports, cannot be said to have made and kept them in the ordinary 
course of its business, nor, of course, can the FDA. U.R.E. 63(13). 
See United States v. Lieberman, 637 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1980); 
Forward Comm. f.2.EE.· v. United States, 608 F.2d 485 (Ct. Cl. 
1979); United States v. Plum, 558 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 1977), 
cert. denied sub !!2!!!· Younge v. United States, 441 U.S. 910 
(1979). But~ Mississippi River Grain Elev., Inc. v. Bartlett 
& co., Grain, 659 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1981). 58 
57 (Cont'd) 
Barney v. Cox, 588 P.2d 696 (Utah 1978), Dr. Done, of course, was 
not competent to testify with respect to the method and circum-
stances of their preparation so as to satisfy the necessary 
foundational requirements. Of course, as we have already noted, 
the DER's were not qualified as an official report under U.R.E. 
63(15) because none of the stated conditions, were, in fact, 
observed. 
58 Nor could these documents be properly recieved on the issue 
of notice to the drug company or the like. First, the DER's 
themselves received in evidence are lumped for a ten year period. 
{Cont 1 ri) 
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Several Federal cases evaluating the reliability of informa-
tion received by government agencies similar to the FDA pursuant 
to similar statutory schemes demonstrate that the materials 
should be rejected as evidence because of their hearsay and 
untrustworthy nature. In McKinnon v. Skil Corp., 638 F.2d 270, 
278 (1st Cir. 1981) the First Circuit upheld the exclusion in a 
products liability case of several Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion reports and a portion of a deposition of a defendant's 
expert witness relying on the information contained in them. In 
that case the plaintiff had urged that these reports be admitted 
to show knowledge of similar accidents, the existence of the 
product's defect, the fact that it caused the plaintiff's injury, 
and the fact that it was negligently designed. The Federal 
appellate court observed that: 
The exclusion of the reports were appro-
priate. They constituted inadmissible hearsay 
on the issues of defect, causation, and 
negligent design. Even if the CPSC report 
arguably could fit within [the] 
exception for public agency reports, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
excluding the reports in the instant case .... 
The CPSC reports are untrustworthy because 
they contain double hea~say in many instances--
the CPSC investigator at one level, and the 
accident victim interviewee at yet another 
level removed. Most of the data contained in 
the reports is simply a paraphrasing of 
versions of accidents given by the victims 
58 (Cont'd) 
Thus, it is unclear how many if any such reports were received 
prior to the drug being prescribed for Mrs. Barson in July of 
1972. Moreover, since it is generally agreed that birth defects 
occur spontaneously in at least 2% of live births, one would 
expect to find thousands of children born with birth defects 
whose mothers coincidentally were given Delalutin. See McKinnon 
v. Skil Corp., 638 F.2d 270, 277 (1st Cir. 1981). 
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themselves who surely cannot be regarded as 
disinterested observers. [McKinnon v. Skil 
Corp., 638 F.2d at 278; emphasis added] 
See also John Mcshane, Inc. v. Cesna Aircraft Co., 563 F.2d 632, 
635-636 (3d Cir. 1977) {Third Circuit upheld the exclusion of 
analogous National Transportation Safety Board accident report 
which included statements by pilots, accident witnesses and 
reports of government investigators). 
The unreliable hearsay which was impermissibly sununarized by 
the defendant's expert was particularly prejudicial to Squibb 
because it amounted to virtually the only evidence directly 
implicating Delalutin in causing limb anomalies. This unreliable 
information was not brought out during the initial examination of 
Dr. Done but was elicited during redirect and after counsel for 
the defendant had clearly and repeatedly advised the trial court 
of the error in permitting such testimony. For these reasons, 
the trial court's error in permitting Dr. Done to testify as to 
the content of these highly prejudicial DER's, requires a reversal 
by this Court. 59 
59 
Receipt of this evidence cannot be justified as data reason-
ably relied upon by experts either. Although this Court in State 
v. Clayton, No. 82-17518 (Utah May 6, 1982) (slip opinion), which 
expanded U.R.E. 56(2) to permit experts to testify based upon 
facts and data not in evidence but which are reasonably relied 
upon by experts in the field, does not permit the receipt of such 
hearsay information in evidence. Cf. Merit Motors, Inc., v. 
Chrysler Corp., 569 F.2d 666, 673 (0:-C. Cir. 1977); Bryailv. John 
Bean Division of FMC Corp., 566 F.2d 541, 546 (5th Cir. 1978--r:--
More important, Dr. Done never laid an adequate foundation that 
such information was reasonably relied upon by experts in the 
particular field. See Fed. R. Evid. 703; Zenith Radio Coro. v. 
. -- ~Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co., Ltd., 505 F.Supp. 1313, 1324-1330 
(E.D. Pa. 1980). - -
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POINT V 
SQUIBB IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BASED UPON 
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE. 
Subsequent to the judge's verdict the Fertility and Maternal 
Health Drug Advisory Committee of the FDA conducted proceedings 
to determine whether modification should be made to the physician 
and patient package inserts which were admitted in evidence 
during this trial. Based upon those hearings the Committee 
recommended to the FDA that it modify the mandated package insert 
for Delalutin finding that "the amended label should indicate 
that progesterone and ... [Delalutin] ... do not appear to have 
any significant teratogenic potential and the current labeling 
suggesting teratogenic potential of sex hormones [should] ... 
be modified" (FDA Fertility Committee Minutes at 17; Tr.2610-2612, 
2625). The FDA currently has this recommendation under advisement 
(Tr. 2614) . 
This evidence was not available during the course of trial 
and could not through the exercise of due diligence been discovered 
and produced. As we have previously noted, the plaintiff made 
repeated use of the FDA mandated warnings to suggest in both 
examination and closing arguments to the jury that the FDA, this 
nation's public heal th expert, believed that Delalutin could 
cause birth defects including limb defects (Tr.2561-2563). In 
view of the dominant evidential role given these warnings, evidence 
that the responsible FDA Advisory Committee studying these drugs 
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had recommended modification of the FDA mandated inserts to 
. . . . f' t 60 exclude Delalutin is signi ican . The evidence was of such 
significance that had it been available at trial there is a 
reasonable likelihood that a different result would have occurred. 
In Gregerson v. Jensen, 617 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980), this court 
held that under U.R.C.P. 59(a)(4) and 60 a party requesting a new 
trial must demonstrate that material and competent evidence was 
in fact newly discovered and that due diligence would not have 
uncovered it prior to trial. In view of the fact that this 
recommendation was made over a month after trial no amount of due 
d · 1 · ld h d d ;t d . th . . 1 t . 1 61 i igence cou ave pro uce • uring e origina ria . 
Cf. In re Adoption of McKinstray v. McKinstray, 628 P.2d 1286 
{Utah 1981). Utah also requires that the evidence not be cumula-
tive or incidental but rather be of such subs~ance that a reason-
able likelihood exists that were it available to the jury they 
would have reached a different result~ See Gregerson v. Jensen, 
617 P.2d at 372. 
Squibb presented such evidence to the trial judge and the 
court's failure to grant a new trial was an abuse of discretion 
warranting reversal. 
60 
The basis of the newly discovered evidence is not the data 
they were reviewed by the Committee which formed the basis of 
their recommendation. Instead it was the recommendation itself 
which is the critical development where an official Advisory 
Committee of the FDA enters a finding in contradiction to an 
earlier FDA action. 
61 
The qualitative nature of this evidence is not the issue. 
It is clearly apparent that the jury received inaccurate and 
incomplete evidence because the FDA mandated package inserts 
alone are before it. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant respectfully urges 
that this Court vacate the Judgment and remand the matter for a 
new trial on all issues. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
By: ~-
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RAY R. CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. 
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